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Abstract 
Cultural-existential psychology draws on the insights and methods of experimental existential 
psychology and cultural psychology to produce a comprehensive understanding of how cultural 
patterns influence experiences of and defenses against existential threat. This study focuses in 
particular on the distinction between disorientation-avoidant cultures—which prioritize 
maintaining a meaningful world—and despair-avoidant cultures—which prioritize maintaining 
people’s sense that they are valuable individuals. Disorientation-avoidance is linked to greater 
orthodox religiosity and collectivist social orientation, while despair-avoidance is linked to 
greater secularism and individualist social orientation. Study 1 examines different reactions to an 
experimentally manipulated threat among more religious and more secularized Undergraduate 
students. This study shows that while religious participants defend against threat by bolstering 
resources external to the self, secular participants bolster the self’s internal resources. Study 2 
examines threat orientations and defense patterns in a traditionalist Mennonite congregation, a 
Unitarian Universalist congregation, and Undergraduate students. Traditionalist Mennonites 
were more likely to experience guilt and less likely to experience anxiety and concerns with 
meaninglessness. Unitarian Universalists were more likely to experience anxiety and less likely 
to experience concerns with self-condemnation. Undergraduates were more likely to experience 
anxiety and death-related angst. As a whole, the results show that culture partly determines 
different patterns of existential threat experience, a finding with implications for cultural and 
existential psychology, as well as for considerations of the functionality and impact of different 
cultural patterns. 
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Disorientation-avoidant and Despair-avoidant Cultures 
 Throughout their lives people experience diverse forms of threat. They encounter 
negative information about themselves; unexpected disasters and illnesses; belief systems 
radically different from their own; pangs of separation from other people who are important in 
their lives; and, after a certain point in their mental development, most people become 
perennially aware of the looming fact that they will die. Research in social psychology suggests 
that people typically rely on psychological coping mechanisms for dealing with such threats, and 
that they derive these buffering mechanisms from the local cultural worldview in which they are 
immersed as a function of being connected to a particular social group. Research also suggests 
that the different patterns of culture guiding human psychology are as diverse as the types of 
threats people experience in their lives. Yet prior investigations have not generally integrated 
these two insights. Correcting this gap, the present study is an exercise in cultural-existential 
psychology: an investigation of the ways in which different cultural patterns orient individuals 
towards certain kinds of existential threat experience and defense.  
 I will begin by discussing the foundations and potential of a cultural-existential 
psychology, then lay the groundwork for the present studies by presenting a model of existential 
threat types. I will argue that there are three primary categories of existential threat: (1) death 
angst, or the threat of personal mortality (the ultimate threat in human experience); (2) threats 
that stem from the possibility of nihilistic disorientation—losing the sense that the world is a 
meaningful and orderly one; and (3) threats that stem from the possibility of nihilistic despair—
losing the sense that one is a valuable self. I will then present two models of cultural threat 
orientation drawing on this typology. Specifically, I will argue that orthodoxly religious, 
collectivist cultures tend to be disorientation-avoidant—they prioritize preserving a sense of the 
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world’s meaning, and orient individuals to experience threats in terms of nihilistic despair. By 
contrast, more secularized, individualist cultures tend to be despair-avoidant—they prioritize 
preserving the self’s value, and orient individuals to experience threats in terms of nihilistic 
disorientation. 
 Two studies tested the distinction between disorientation- and despair-avoidant threat 
orientations. Study 1 examined differences in religiosity-secularism within a single subcultural 
group (university Undergraduates), and manipulated exposure to a particular kind of threat (a 
hypothetical natural disaster). Potential reactions and defensive responses were assessed to 
determine if more religious participants reacted to threat by bolstering external sources of 
protection, while more secularized participants reacted by bolstering the self’s internal resources 
(i.e., a sense of personal control). Study 2 adopted a cross-cultural approach by examining 
cultural variables, threat orientations, and defensive structures in three different subcultures: a 
traditionalist Mennonite congregation; a Unitarian Universalist congregation; and 
Undergraduates. 
Cultural-existential psychology 
 Over the course of approximately the last three decades, two sub-fields have emerged in 
social psychology that are particularly relevant for the study of the reciprocal relationship 
between culture and experiences of suffering or threat. The first is experimental existential 
psychology (XXP; Greenberg, Koole, & Pyszczynski, 2004), which seeks to understand human 
experiences of threat, defense, and flourishing by testing the ideas of existentialism using 
contemporary experimental methods. The other is cultural psychology (Markus & Kitayama, 
1991; Shweder, 1990; Triandis, 1989), which uses a variety of methods to demonstrate 1) the 
complex interrelationship between (or “mutual constitution” of) culture and psyche, and 2) the 
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resulting diversity in motivational, cognitive, and attitudinal processes—once assumed to be 
fairly universal by social psychologists—as a function of variation in cultural and social 
organizational factors. The current study is an exercise in cultural-existential psychology, which 
essentially attempts to combine aspects of these two approaches to produce a comprehensive 
understanding of how people from diverse settings and with diverse beliefs differentially 
experience and defend against existential threat. 
 XXP was inaugurated by terror management theory (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & 
Solomon, 1986), which highlights the (largely nonconscious) role of death awareness in the 
creation and maintenance of culture, as well as the individual’s pursuit of self-esteem. Building 
off this contribution, XXP research generally seeks to demonstrate the ways in which 
psychological experience across the lifespan is influenced by what are assumed to be four 
uniquely human attributes (see Langer, 1988): (1) the capacity for symbolic consciousness and 
language; (2) a keen sense of self-awareness and capacity for self-reflection contingent on (1); 
(3) an awareness of personal mortality and perennial finitude (i.e., extended temporal self-
consciousness) contingent on (2); and (4) an embeddedness in culture that results from the 3 
prior givens and also grounds our experience of them. Although it assumes these human 
existential givens, XXP also strives to retain an awareness that humans are embodied animals. 
This implies that the framework both is broadly consistent with evolutionary theory and traces a 
large portion of human suffering back to the conflict between biological limitations and symbolic 
consciousness (Pyszczynski, Sullivan, & Greenberg, in press). To summarize this perspective 
and body of research, XXP attests to the fundamental ideas of existential philosophers Nietzsche 
(1887/1964) and Sartre (1943/2001). These authors argued that humans, as self-aware animals 
who recognize finitude and find themselves embedded in malleable webs of meaning, require a 
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sense of positive self-regard and an ultimately meaningful interpretation of reality to avoid 
nihilism or psychopathology. In its attempt to provide empirical support for these ideas, XXP is 
predicated on a functional conception of culture—cultural worldviews provide standards for 
individuals to meet in order to attain self-esteem and the conviction that they are objects of 
ultimate value in a meaningful universe (Becker, 1973; Pyszczynski et al., in press). However, 
research in this area has tended to ignore the role of culture in shaping the experience of threat, 
focusing instead on the presumably universal role of existential threat in generating attachment 
to culture. 
1 
While the construct existential threat and its various manifestations will be discussed 
in more detail in the following section, for now I provisionally define the term as an experience 
of negative (conscious or unconscious) affect resulting from an infringement on the person’s 
symbolic defenses against death, i.e., their sense of meaning or personal value (and it should be 
assumed that when I use the term “threat” in this paper it is shorthand for existential threat, as 
here defined). 
 Cultural psychology is a diverse sub-field whose practitioners tend to focus less on 
motivational givens and more on contextual variation in human behavior and thinking styles 
(e.g., Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001; Triandis, 1989; Vygotsky, 1978). In this 
approach, culture refers to the sum total of patterns of behavior, beliefs, and humanly influenced 
objects in which an individual is immersed by virtue of connection to a particular social group 
(Adams & Markus, 2004). One of the guiding dictums of cultural psychology is the notion of 
mutual constitution (Markus & Kitayama, 2010), that culture and mind “make each other up” in 
a reciprocal process. This idea is essentially a recapitulation of sociologist Anthony Giddens’ 
(1986) resolution to the problem of agency and structure: 
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Structure [read: culture] is both the medium and the outcome of the human activities 
which it recursively organizes. By the recursive character of social life I mean that social 
activity in respect of its structural properties exists in and through the use of the resources 
which agents make in constituting their action, which at the same time reconstitutes those 
structural properties as qualities of the system in question (p. 533). 
Importantly, the cultural patterns that individuals draw upon, enact, and modify can be both 
explicit (i.e., discursively symbolic) and implicit, meaning they can have the character of 
nonconscious habitus (Bourdieu, 1977). Although many cultural psychologists contend that these 
patterns have their origin in human psychologies (Berger, 1967), they are often maintained and 
reinforced by elements of local, historically shaped ecologies or “intentional worlds” (Gelfand et 
al., 2011; Shweder, 1990). In other words, cultural patterns often constitute aspects of system 
integration, or the functioning of societies on a mass level outside the immediate awareness of 
individual actors (Giddens, 1984). For example, technological and economic factors make a 
massive contribution to the way individuals experience movement through and existence in time 
and space (Giddens, 1984); however, this aspect of experience is not typically consciously 
recognized, nor is it always symbolically represented in a given cultural context.  
Although a fruitful perspective for research, cultural psychology has tended to 
perseverate on the description of patterns rather than the explication of processes; in short, the 
opposite problem of that evidenced by XXP. In particular, the sub-field has often narrowly 
focused on two broad cultural types referred to as collectivism—a set of patterns encouraging 
self-definition in terms of group membership or relational ties and prioritization of group goals 
and well-being—and individualism—a set of patterns encouraging self-definition in terms of a 
personal identity and prioritization of one’s own goals and well-being.  
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Nevertheless, the historical roots of cultural psychology in psychological anthropology or 
the “culture and personality” school of the 1940s-1960s suggest several potential points of 
convergence between existential and cultural psychology that remain to be systematically 
explored. 
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 Specifically, scholars like Hallowell (1938), Spiro (1965), and Whiting and Child 
(1953) consistently emphasized both that cultural beliefs serve as defense mechanisms, and that 
threat experiences are culturally sensitive. Summarizing this perspective, anthropologist John 
Gillin argued that culture predisposes individuals to perceive certain events and information as 
threatening, and to employ certain defenses for coping with or repressing those threats (Gillin, 
1951; Gillin & Nicholson, 1951). In other words, from this viewpoint, there is a threat-culture 
mutual constitution cycle that can be conceived as a sub-cycle of the general interaction between 
the individual and their environment. If they are to be maintained, cultural patterns must have the 
capacity to orient individuals towards interpretations of and responses to threatening events that 
attach them even more deeply to those patterns (Berger & Luckmann, 1966).  
Cultural-existential psychology is here proposed as a framework for drawing out these 
correspondences between the functional-motivational conceptions of culture in XXP and cultural 
psychology. Its special province would be the role of cultural variables in orienting individuals 
towards particular threat experiences and responses. While the tenets of this framework are not 
new, it attempts to translate into contemporary social psychology an insight long recognized but 
often ignored, namely, that neither cultural meaning nor human suffering can be adequately 
understood without reference to the other. It is not a coincidence that several of the most 
important thinkers for the social sciences—notably, Nietzsche, Weber, Durkheim, Georg 
Simmel, Otto Rank, and Karl Jaspers—attempted both to wrestle with the realities of human 
suffering and to systematize the contingencies of cultural-historical variation. 
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Levels and types of existential threat 
 Existential threat is the onset of negative (conscious or unconscious) affect experienced 
when the individual becomes aware of the possibility of the non-being of the self in one of the 
aspects of its being (Sullivan, Landau, & Kay, 2012; Tillich, 1952). Because of the unique 
attributes of human cognition, it can be argued that human being consists of three modes: ontic 
or physical being; cultural being, i.e., existing in a meaningful worldview shared with others; and 
personal-moral being, i.e., existing from a uniquely individual standpoint, in an autobiography of 
actualized, ethical choices (Binswanger, 1958; Tillich, 1952). Translated into the parlance of 
social psychology, in addition to needs relevant to physical survival, individuals have needs for 
(1) a sense of ultimate meaning rooted in social identity, and (2) a sense of positive personal 
moral value and self-esteem. The individual becomes aware of their finitude and potential non-
being when one of these resources or aspects of their being is compromised, or when one seems 
to be in a state of disharmony with the other (Sullivan et al., 2012; Pyszczynski et al., in press).  
 Philosophical and XXP perspectives hold that death—and, importantly, the individual’s 
awareness of inevitable personal mortality—is at the root of all existential threat experiences, 
because it is the asymptotic limit of all experienced finitude and the ultimate threat to ontic, 
physical existence, which also implies the annihilation of symbolic, psychological affirmation on 
the cultural and personal value dimensions (Tillich, 1952). For a threat to qualify as existential, it 
must trigger (often outside of conscious awareness) the potential for death-related fear 
(Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, & Hamilton, 1990). Because cultural buffers (e.g., religious 
or other symbolic value systems) typically convince individuals of their literal or symbolic 
immortality, however, existential threat is only rarely experienced as conscious, unrepressed 
death fear. Rather, non-being is often experienced indirectly, as a threat either to one’s culturally 
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derived sense of meaning, or to one’s sense of personal (moral) value. Studies have shown that 
threats to these symbolic resources increase the accessibility of death-related thoughts outside 
conscious awareness (Hayes, Schimel, Arndt, & Faucher, 2010). Threats to meaning are 
generally experienced as the existential emotion of uncertainty-related anxiety, whereas threats 
to personal value are generally experienced as the existential emotions of guilt or shame (Lazarus 
& Lazarus, 1994; Sullivan et al., 2012). An important distinction between these two threat forms 
lies in their standard relation to temporality (Schrag, 1961, 1969). Experiences of anxiety 
prototypically have a prospective relation to time because individuals’ concerns with meaning 
relate to their level of certainty about how to act in the future, whereas guilt experiences 
prototypically have a retrospective relation to time because individuals’ self-esteem concerns 
relate to the value of actions that we have already performed (or failed to perform). 
 These threats can manifest at both “relative/temporary” and “absolute/ultimate” levels 
(Sullivan et al., 2012; Tillich, 1952). At the level of a temporary threat, the individual senses 
(consciously or not) that one of their modes of being is being infringed upon or compromised in 
a concrete situation. The individual typically has an array of culturally conditioned defenses that 
can be employed to neutralize the threat. If these defenses are ineffective, however, the threat 
becomes ultimate, meaning that the person experiences an overwhelming dread as their ultimate 
sense of meaning or personal value—their primary defenses against non-being—are called into 
question. Such ultimate threats, if sustained, result in nihilism or profound absurdity: the 
perceived loss of any legitimation for one’s existence (Camus, 1955/1991; Nietzsche, 
1887/1964).  
 Thus, I will distinguish between three levels of existential threat. I will refer to the lowest 
level of threat using the terms anxiety and guilt, referring to emotional experiences of either 
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prospective uncertainty or retrospective regret in concrete situations. I will broadly use the term 
angst to designate threat experiences at the second or ultimate level. Following Tillich (1952), I 
will distinguish between meaninglessness angst—the ultimate form of first-level anxiety—and 
condemnation angst—the ultimate form of first-level guilt. The structure and relationships 
between these two types and levels of threat, as well as their relation to death angst, have been 
empirically examined in a few key studies (Barr, 2010; Rothschild, Landau, Sullivan, & Keefer, 
2012; Weems, Costa, Dehon, & Berman (2004). Finally, I will use the term nihilism to designate 
the complete loss of a mode of being, which only occurs in extreme and pathological instances. 
Following Nietzsche (see Reginster, 2006; Sullivan, 2013), I will distinguish between nihilistic 
disorientation—the nihilism that results from sustained meaninglessness angst—and nihilistic 
despair—the nihilism that results from sustained condemnation angst. Put simply, nihilistic 
disorientation results when the individual’s worldview is no longer seen as valid or compelling, 
and they lose all guides for further action; whereas nihilistic despair results when the individual 
feels utterly inadequate and condemned by the standards of their worldview. 
 The relationships between these different levels and types of threats are presented in 
overview in Figure 1. To clarify, let me give a concrete example of how an individual might 
progress through these threat levels. If I were uncertain about what concrete steps to take to write 
and format my dissertation in social psychology, and began to procrastinate and avoid working 
on the document, I would likely experience anxiety. If this anxiety were sustained over several 
weeks in unpleasant rumination, I may begin to question whether I even want to become a social 
psychologist, and whether this profession has any value, and ultimately whether academia itself 
is a viable enterprise—at this stage I would be experiencing meaninglessness angst. Imagining 
further that my defense date passes, I fail, drop out of graduate school and do not seek further 
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academic employment, unable to resolve the ultimate questions about the value of this 
profession—I may become convinced that there is no viable path to value in my society, and 
experience nihilistic disorientation. At this stage it is likely that I would contemplate suicide. 
3
 
 A final observation should be made regarding this classification of threats. Nihilistic 
disorientation, meaninglessness angst, and anxiety, on the one hand, and nihilistic despair, 
condemnation angst, and guilt, on the other, are far from orthogonal constructs. Consider that 
nihilistic disorientation is basically the ultimate threat to one’s cultural worldview, while 
nihilistic despair is the ultimate threat to one’s self-esteem. XXP researchers have long argued 
that self-esteem and the cultural worldview are deeply intertwined: individuals derive self-
esteem by meeting the standards of the worldview (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1986). Thus, the 
individual’s senses of self-esteem and culturally-derived meaning are often correlated, and 
threats to one resource will often infringe upon the other (hence, guilt and anxiety may often co-
occur). However, it is possible and useful to distinguish between these two general types of 
threat for several reasons. Most relevant for the current study is that different cultural and 
religious patterns orient individuals to prioritize either shared meaning or personal self-esteem, 
and therefore expose individuals more to one or the other kind of existential threat.  
Cultural threat orientations 
 Having outlined the different levels and types of existential threat, it is now possible to 
distinguish between two general threat-orientations that are prominent at the cultural level. 
Although it is possible for an individual to experience nihilism, this extreme form of existential 
threat is only likely to be found among clinical or unusual populations; therefore, it is more apt to 
use the term nihilism to designate the threat orientation of an entire culture. Specifically, cultures 
can be classified on the basis of the type of nihilism against which they primarily inoculate their 
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members (Sullivan, 2013). Some cultures may be called disorientation-avoidant (DISA), 
meaning that the beliefs and socialization processes within the culture operate to maintain the 
sacrosanct nature of shared cultural values and neutralize the threat of meaninglessness angst. 
Others are despair-avoidant (DESA)—the primary function of shared beliefs and socialization is 
to protect the value of the individual and neutralize the threat of condemnation angst. 
Importantly, I propose that cultural values and beliefs are often such that by primarily protecting 
individuals from one form of nihilism, they orient individuals towards lower-level threat 
experiences of the opposite form, meaning that DISA cultures tend to orient individuals toward 
guilt and condemnation angst, while DESA cultures tend to orient them towards anxiety and 
meaninglessness angst. 
 Again, it is useful to consider these cultural orientations in terms of prototypic examples. 
Here the classic case involves the distinction between collectivist, orthodoxly religious cultures, 
on the one hand, and individualist, more secularized cultures on the other. Although the 
religious-secular and collectivist-individualist continua are far from perfectly correlated, a great 
deal of theory and evidence suggests that, historically, devout religiosity and collectivist social 
orientation were normative in most human societies, and the rise of individualism tends to be 
associated with a move towards secularity or a less rigid form of religiosity (e.g., Bellah, 1964; 
Durkheim, 1972; Gauchet, 1997; Norris & Inglehart, 2011). Accepting the validity of this 
association at the most general level, it is clear that collectivist, orthodoxly religious cultures are 
paradigmatically DISA in at least three ways: (1) a set of integrated beliefs make all aspects of 
life seem interconnected and meaningful, sheltering the individual from meaninglessness angst; 
(2) the need to maintain group harmony is satisfied by providing individuals with clear goals and 
standards for behavior, which preempt anxiety and uncertainty; and (3) in many religious 
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traditions and collectivist cultures, suffering is primarily explained as resulting from deviant 
behavior, thus orienting individuals towards guilt and condemnation angst and away from 
nihilistic disorientation (Sullivan, Landau, Kay, & Rothschild, 2012). By contrast, individualist, 
primarily secular cultures are paradigmatically DESA in at least three ways: 1) the presence of 
norms and values prioritizing individual worth and success equip the individual with a variety of 
self-serving biases, and hence protection against condemnation angst (Cross, Hardin, & Gercek-
Swing, 2011); 2) the focus on personal, rather than group-centric, goal-striving, as well as 
increased tolerance for idiosyncratic behavior, relieves individuals of felt obligation to most of 
the people around them and reduces the likelihood of guilt; and 3) since secularism and 
individualism are often associated with a more skeptical attitude towards reality and a 
diminished sense of social support, individuals in such cultures are oriented towards anxiety and 
meaninglessness angst even as they eschew nihilistic despair. 
 It should be noted that even as cultures tend to orient individuals away from one class of 
existential threats and towards another, they also often provide a defensive infrastructure or 
belief system that ameliorates the threats toward which the individual is oriented (Gillin, 1951). 
For instance, collectivist, orthodoxly religious cultures often encourage interpretations of 
misfortune that stress personal guilt; however, they also provide means to routinely process and 
reduce guilt, such as rituals of religious atonement or reparation towards community members. 
Individualist, secular cultures orient individuals to experience misfortune in terms of uncertainty 
and anxiety about a chaotic world; yet at the same time they promote beliefs that convince 
individuals that they personally will be able to navigate the uncertain world, even if others 
cannot. Schluchter (1981) refers to such beliefs as “abstract contingency formulas,” and they 
include strong illusions of personal control and the related belief in a just world, namely, that 
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good outcomes follow for good individuals (Lerner, 1980). In secularized societies that tend to 
be devoid of beliefs of a concrete and specific nature, such abstract formulas help individuals 
maintain the sense that they can cope on their own with a shifting and uncertain environment. 
 The present research is an exploration of how the DISA and DESA threat orientations 
manifest in religious-collectivist and secular-individualist subcultures. However, because the 
variables of religiosity-secularism and collectivism-individualism—as well as their 
relationship—are far from straightforward, a discussion of some of the complexities and varieties 
involved in these two major cultural variables is necessary before turning to the present studies. 
Varieties of religiosity-secularism and individualism 
 Religion is clearly a major cultural variable, with relevance for a variety of issues – but 
especially for the domain of coping with existential threat. Indeed, there is a prominent history in 
psychology of defining religion as a system of beliefs designed to cope with existential threats. 
William James (1902) famously defined the religious experience in this way: 
It consists of two parts: — (1) an uneasiness and (2) its solution. The uneasiness, reduced 
to its simplest terms, is a sense that there is something wrong about us as we naturally 
stand. The solution is a sense that we are saved from the wrongness by making proper 
connection with higher powers (p. 383). 
More recently, Batson, Schoenrade, and Ventis (1993) opened their definitive review of the 
psychological research on religion by defining the construct quite broadly as “whatever we as 
individuals do to come to grips personally with the questions that confront us because we are 
aware that we and others like us are alive and that we will die” (p. 8). Although these psycho-
functional perspectives on religion might be considered reductionist by scholars who insist on 
the social-structural aspects of religion (Durkheim, 1915/1965), or who see them as biased by 
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modern modes of religiosity (Gauchet, 1997), it is nevertheless clear that whatever other 
functions they might serve, religious beliefs are a major cultural-historical force in providing 
individuals with interpretations of and defenses against existential threat (Atran & Norenzayan, 
2004; Berger, 1967; O’Dea, 1966). This is especially the case if we extend the notion of 
religiosity to include the contemporary subversion, transformation, or decline of religious belief 
that is broadly encompassed by the term secularism. From the perspective of cultural-existential 
psychology, a person’s relative degree and type of religiosity should have a profound effect on 
their experience of existential threat. In fact, a large body of research suggests a modest 
association between religious belief/practice and lower levels of anxiety (e.g., Batson et al., 
1993; Park & Slattery, 2012). 
 Religious beliefs do not arise from a vacuum, however; they are grounded in modes of 
social organization and group affiliation (Durkheim, 1915/1965). Typically, practicing a religion 
involves belonging to a particular community of fellow worshippers and engaging in periodic 
rituals with these other individuals. In investigations of existential threat, it is important to 
consider not only the person’s belief system, but the mode of sociality underlying that system. 
Indeed, social identity theory researchers have proposed that the benefits of religiosity for coping 
with threat may be an interactive function of both one’s belief system and the group 
belongingness that often accompanies it (Ysseldyk, Matheson, & Anisman, 2010). These issues 
are especially important because depending on the type of religion and corresponding 
community, the nature and extent of the individual’s immersion in a social group as a function of 
their religious beliefs will vary. Although there are important links between religious and social 
orientation, this connection becomes complex when considering different cultural patterns. 
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 In many historical examples—and still today in many communities—religious beliefs 
dominated most aspects of the individual’s cognition and attitudes. Wherever religion is a 
comprehensive framework for organizing daily activities and total psychological experience, 
religious involvement is likely to correspond to a collectivist social orientation, meaning that the 
individual feels strong attachment to a network of kin-based and social ties with others who 
share their religious beliefs (Almond, Appleby, & Sivan, 2003; Berger, 1967). Although this 
kind of social orientation has assumed many different specific forms throughout history, cultures 
that are both collectivist in social orientation and orthodoxly religious tend to have a common 
DISA orientation (Baumeister, 1991). That is, individuals are oriented by their religious beliefs 
towards maintaining harmony in their group, rejecting outsiders, keeping overly individualistic 
and self-serving behavior in check, and avoiding nihilistic disorientation by interpreting 
misfortune in terms of individual deviance and guilt (Durkheim, 1972; Gelfand et al., 2011; 
Hostetler, 1974). 
 With the rise of individualism as a prominent social orientation in many postindustrial, 
urban settings, the relation between religiosity and group belongingness became more 
multifaceted. Individualist cultural patterns lay stress on questioning existing knowledge and 
constructing unique identities (e.g., Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002; Tweed & Lehman, 
2002), and these values are associated with a proliferation of ways of “doing religion” (Taylor, 
2007). Individualist settings foster various forms of “private,” “individualistic,” and “civil” 
religiosity (Bellah, 1964; Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985) that may have 
more to do with a personal identity narrative, or an amorphous national identification, than with 
embeddedness in a local community. These constellations of religiosity are further complicated 
by the rise of various forms of secularism, which does not necessarily connote the opposite or 
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complete absence of religion. Secularism at the societal level—which, as mentioned, has been 
empirically associated with the spread of cultural individualism—implies the emergence of 
social attitudes that make religiosity appear to be an (intellectually difficult) choice among many 
alternatives, rather than a given aspect of identity (Taylor, 2007). Within societies, individuals 
and groups may adopt a range of secular beliefs systems, ranging from mere insistence on the 
privatization of religion to militant atheism (Casanova, 2012). 
 Perhaps because of the complexity involved, these distinctions in forms of religiosity and 
secularism have not received extensive examination in psychological research (Hall, Koenig, & 
Meador, 2008). I propose that one path towards distinguishing between the different forms of 
religiosity that manifest in individualist cultural settings is to make distinctions between different 
forms of individualist social orientation. Although collectivism-individualism is a popular 
heuristic in cultural psychological research, there are a variety of forms of social orientation that 
belie this simple dichotomy (e.g., Keller, 2012).  
Where individualism is concerned, an influential distinction has been between what 
Simmel (1971) called “quantitative” and “qualitative” individualism – that is, individualism 
based either on “equality” or “difference”; on a common recognition of human essence and 
entitlement, or on variations in skills, traits, and status between persons. This is related to the 
“expressive” and “utilitarian” forms of individualism proposed by Bellah et al. (1985), and the 
“horizontal” and “vertical” forms established in cultural psychological research (e.g., Singelis, 
Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995). To summarize these various categorizations, in certain 
societies and subcultures individualism takes the form of a valorization and defense of the right 
of each individual to develop their unique potentialities and enjoy substantive equality of 
opportunity. In this horizontal/expressive variant of individualism, the possible excesses of self-
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involvement are (ideally) tempered by a conviction that individuals share a common humanity, 
which should be protected through an equal distribution of social resources. In other societies or 
subcultures an alternate strain of individualism flourishes, one that is characterized by atomism 
and a “free market” ethos. This vertical/utilitarian individualism thrives on the fundamental 
value of non-interference in the activities of all persons, and insists on de-regulation of social life 
so that individuals may pursue their best interests and succeed or fail according to their merits. 
The two forms of individualism are related to structural and economic institutions. Horizontal 
individualism is only possible where infrastructures and forums exist for individuals to come 
together in communal dialogue and receive equal representation, and where regulations are 
placed on wealth and power channels. Vertical individualism, instead, thrives in settings where 
people live more isolated lives and there are few checks on differential access to and 
maintenance of resources (Fiske, 1991). 
Distinguishing between these two cultural variants of individualism places us in a 
position to evaluate the kinds of religiosity or secularism that will be associated with each, and 
related differences in their threat orientations. Although the prior analysis would predict that both 
forms should generally promote a DESA orientation—prioritizing individual self-esteem at the 
cost of greater meaninglessness angst—specific patterns of threat and defense may differ in each, 
partly as a function of religious attitudes. Horizontal/expressive individualism should be 
associated with a “radical” approach to religiosity-secularism (Diken, 2009), whereby 
individuals adopt a “questing” orientation towards religion connected to the pursuit of 
knowledge and social justice (Batson et al., 1993). Individuals in such settings may be intensely 
concerned with religious issues insofar as they relate to the interests of humanism, but rather than 
accept religious traditions they will tend to pursue a post-traditional search for the deep truths of 
18 
human nature and morality. In many instances, this pursuit will take the form of an exchange 
with like-minded and similarly committed individuals. Vertical/utilitarian individualism should 
instead foster a “hands-off” or “passive” approach to religiosity (Diken, 2009). In settings where 
competition between individuals for status and self-definition is paramount, religion tends to be 
seen as a personal affair, and not a primary source of existential consolation. Religious diversity 
in these contexts is an accepted fact of life; but rather than encourage the quest for universal 
truths, it tends to undermine attachment to a given set of beliefs. Utilitarian individualists 
navigate the world by relying on their own sense of personal control and their belief in the 
rational nature of predictable contingencies, rather than a concrete meaning system (whether 
religious or secular). 
Thus, just as there are two forms of individualism, there are at least two corresponding 
forms of DESA threat orientation. While both horizontal and vertical individualists will be 
oriented to experience threat more in terms of anxiety, and less in terms of guilt, there will 
nevertheless be important differences in their specific patterns of threat orientation. Horizontal 
individualism represents a “pure” DESA orientation, whereby the possibility of nihilistic despair 
is completely denied through an insistence on the inherent value of each person, and the overall 
benevolence of the world and human nature. Thus, despite their susceptibility to meaninglessness 
angst, horizontal individualists are defended against condemnation angst by a high sense of self-
worth and a strong this-worldly value system. Vertical individualists, on the other hand, 
generally lack a concrete meaning system in which to ground their self-esteem. Theirs is a 
seemingly chaotic world which they navigate using self-serving biases and abstract contingency 
formulas (e.g., the belief that good outcomes follow from good behaviors), resulting in a more 
fragile sense of self-esteem that is their primary defense against threat (Baumeister, Heatherton, 
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& Tice, 1993). Importantly, theory and research also suggest that vertical individualists should 
be especially susceptible to death angst. Scholars in multiple disciplines have argued that the fear 
of death is more salient for people in settings with greater cultural individualism (Bauman, 1992; 
Langer, 1988; Tillich, 1952), because greater orientation towards one’s personal life narrative 
heightens the desire for self-immortality and exacerbates the sense of loss experienced in 
anticipation of one’s own demise. Supporting this, research shows that higher levels of 
collectivism are predictive of lower levels of death angst (Orehek, Sasota, Kruglanski, 
Ridgeway, & Dechesne, 2011). Vertical individualists are in a double-bind, because their 
competitive quest for self-esteem is ultimately a yearning for personal immortality (Becker, 
1973), which they must pursue without the support of an intact meaning system. Thus, while 
both horizontal and vertical individualists should be more oriented towards anxiety, vertical 
individualists should be especially oriented towards death angst. 
The present research 
 The present research represents a first step in directly establishing the empirical value of 
a cultural-existential perspective. Two studies explore various aspects of the distinction between 
DISA and DESA cultural threat orientations. 
 Study 1 is a basic examination of how cultural tendencies influence interpretations of and 
defensive responses to an existential threat. It employs the standard experimental approach of 
social psychology by manipulating the experience of threat and examining individual variation in 
a single cultural context—namely, within a sample of Undergraduate students at a large state 
university. Since the research was conducted at the University of Kansas, I focused on 
participant reactions to an ecologically valid type of threat—namely, the hypothetical devastation 
of the local setting by a tornado, a not-uncommon experience in the “Tornado Alley” region on 
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the fringes of which the University is located (exposure to this threat has been reliably used to 
experimentally elicit anxiety in this population before; see Wohl, Branscombe, & Reysen, 2010). 
Keeping the general cultural identity of the participants constant and manipulating the threat 
experience allows for better assessment of causal influence. However, even within a sample of 
Undergraduates, cultural diversity can be approximately assessed through the use of individual 
difference measures. Study 1 therefore focuses on the role of more symbolic, subjectivist aspects 
culture in shaping threat experience, by examining whether more religious (vs. more secularized) 
Undergraduates respond to a tornado threat in different ways. 
 Study 2 adopts a more cultural-psychological approach by examining differences in both 
symbolic meaning systems and social orientation across three subcultural groups: traditionalist 
Mennonites (orthodoxly religious and collectivist); Unitarian Universalists (liberally religious, 
bordering on secular, and horizontal individualist); and Undergraduates (moderately religious 
and vertically individualist). The two studies together provide a comprehensive overview of how 
symbolic and structural cultural patterns influence individuals to experience threats more in 
terms of guilt or anxiety, and to defend against them using either more collective, external or 
personal, internal resources. 
Study 1 
 In a preliminary investigation of DISA/DESA threat orientations, Study 1 assessed 
variation in university Undergraduates on the religiosity-secularism dimension and reactions to 
the threat of a natural disaster. University of Kansas participants first completed measures of 
intrinsic religiosity—the extent to which one is religiously devout, and one’s entire life is 
influenced by religious belief—and quest religiosity—the extent to which one maintains a 
skeptical and open-minded attitude towards religion and meaning in life, essentially a measure of 
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secular tendencies (Batson et al., 1993). Half the participants were then exposed to an 
ecologically valid threat—a hypothetical tornado experience—while the other half received a 
control induction. Participants wrote about the hypothetical threat experience, and their 
responses were coded for salient themes. Finally, participants responded to several worldview-
relevant items as a measure of reliance on culturally derived defenses. These included measures 
of perceived control, belief in a just world, and self-esteem. 
 I predicted that more intrinsically religious participants would exhibit a DISA orientation: 
they would tend to experience the tornado in terms of negative affect, particularly guilt feelings, 
and they would primarily rely on external, collective support systems in coping with the threat 
(e.g., family members, God belief). I also predicted that participants scoring higher in quest 
religiosity would exhibit a DESA orientation: they would tend to experience the tornado in terms 
of concern with potential meaninglessness, and rely on self-focused coping strategies to defend 
against the threat. In particular, in line with the foregoing analysis of DESA patterns and vertical 
individualism, I expected participants who scored high on quest orientation to bolster their belief 
in the abstract contingency formula of belief in a just world in response to a tornado. Secularized 
participants were predicted to cling more strongly to this belief as a means of maintaining their 
sense of overall control in the wake of threat. As Lerner (1980) proposed in his comprehensive 
presentation of just world theory, the belief that good outcomes follow for good people is 
essentially a psychological contract or formula endorsed by people as a route to maintaining 
control in a chaotic environment. I thus predicted that belief in a just world would mediate 
defensively enhanced control perceptions among participants scoring high in quest religiosity. 
Method 
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Eighty-eight (61 female) Undergraduate students at the University of Kansas participated 
in a laboratory experiment in exchange for course credit. Of these, 70% of the sample identified 
as Christian (either Catholic or Protestant); 26% as “non-religious” or “other”; and of the 
remaining three participants, 2 identified as Jewish and 1 as Hindu. 
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Participants completed 
initial measures of religiosity and existential quest orientation, and then were randomly assigned 
to either a tornado or no threat video condition. They then wrote short essays about their 
reactions to the video they had seen. In addition to these essays, the outcomes of interest were 
ratings of emotions felt after watching the video and the World Assumptions Scale (Janoff-
Bulman, 1989). Participants completed all materials separately in individual cubicles. 
Intrinsic religiosity. After completing basic demographics measures, participants 
completed a 10-item intrinsic religiosity scale (modified from Hoge, 1972). Participants rated (on 
7-point scales; 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) the extent to which they hold deep-
seated religious convictions, and the extent to which their religious beliefs guide their daily 
behavior and attitudes. For the full list of items included in this measure and all measures used in 
this study, see Appendix A. The items showed good reliability (α = .93), and were averaged to 
form a composite scale, with higher scores indicating greater intrinsic religiosity.  
Existential quest. Participants then completed the existential quest scale (van 
Pachterbeke, Keller, & Saroglou, 2011). The scale can be considered an index of a more questing 
and secularized approach to religious issues. It assesses several elements, such as need for 
cognition, more secular or exploratory attitudes, and a strong tendency to search for a sense of 
meaning in life. Participants used 7-point scales (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Van 
Pachterbeke et al. (2011) demonstrated the psychometric properties of the scale and showed in 
multiple studies that it was negatively correlated with need for cognitive closure and right-wing 
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authoritarianism. The nine items on the existential quest scale showed acceptable reliability (α = 
.71), and were averaged to yield composite scores. 
In addition to these more specific belief-related measures, participants responded to a 
single item capturing general religiosity: “How important are your religious beliefs to you?” (1 = 
not very important, 7 = very important). Existential quest was negatively correlated with this 
general item, r = -.28, p = .01, and with intrinsic religiosity, r = -.39, p < .001. Intrinsic 
religiosity was highly correlated with general religiosity, r = .83, p < .001.  
 Video manipulation. Participants were then randomly assigned to watch one of two 
videos prepared by the experimenters. Before watching, they were instructed to imagine what it 
would be like to personally experience the events depicted in the video. The participants watched 
the videos on computers while wearing noise-cancelling headphones, with the volume set to a 
fairly loud (but not uncomfortable) level. 
 In the tornado video condition, participants watched an approximately 2:30-minute video 
clip excerpted and edited from the National Geographic documentary Forces of Nature (2004). 
This video contained images from the 1999 Oklahoma tornado outbreak, and specifically the 
Bridge Creek/Moore tornado that devastated the small town of Bridge Creek. Participants saw 
scenes of people frantically preparing for the tornado’s approach, the tornado itself, and the 
destruction left in its wake. In general, the clip was very representative of the devastation caused 
by tornadoes in the Midwest, and particularly the Oklahoma-Kansas region. Before watching the 
video, participants in this condition were asked to imagine what it would be like if a tornado like 
this one destroyed the city of Lawrence (their current residence and the location of the University 
of Kansas). After the clip ended, participants were instructed:  
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Now that you have imagined a tornado destroying your town, please take some time to 
write about your visualization experience. In the box below, please type your thoughts 
about what it would be like if a tornado actually ruined your current place of residence 
and the residences of all your friends. What emotions would you experience and how 
would your life be affected? 
 Participants in the no threat condition watched a clip of approximately the same length 
primarily excerpted from the film Days of Heaven (Malick, 1978), combined with some neutral 
images from Forces of Nature. The video began with an image of plants growing in a field, 
being tended by a lone farmer. This image was followed by others of agricultural landscapes and 
country scenes typical of the Midwest, including scenes of people riding trains, workers 
performing agricultural labor with machinery, or people relaxing in nature. In general, the no 
threat video was designed to prime ideas of nature and the Midwest that were also prominent in 
the tornado video, but without presenting any destructive or fearful imagery. After the clip 
ended, participants were instructed to write about what it would be like to have the experiences 
of being in nature depicted in the video.  
 Coding of tornado video responses. Of the 88 total participants, 45 were assigned to the 
tornado video condition. I was interested in exploring the themes and ideas expressed in the 
essays written by these participants, and testing their association with intrinsic religiosity and 
existential quest. Based on casual reading of the essays and my theoretical analysis, I developed 
a coding scheme with two independent raters. The codes did not stem from any specific prior 
method or set of codes, and were based on prior research only insofar as the latter was relevant to 
the foregoing theoretical analysis. Specifically, the raters coded each tornado essay for the 
following 10 themes: Focus on disaster situation vs. Focus on disaster aftermath; Concern with 
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suffering of self vs. Concern with suffering of others; Responsibility for others; Self as source of 
strength; Family/community as source of strength; Loss of property and possessions in financial 
terms; Loss of property and possessions in sentimental terms; Concerns with establishing 
secondary control; Threats to meaning; and Disruption of reality. Raters coded for the first 2 
themes on scales of 1 = Situation, 5 = Aftermath and 1 = Self, 5 = Others, respectively. The 
remaining 8 themes were coded on the scale 1 = Mostly absent, 5 = Very present. The 
Responsibility for others theme referred to whether participants felt an immediate obligation to 
help others in the situation. Concerns with establishing secondary control was rated as a present 
theme if an essay demonstrated the attempt to see broader forces outside the self as controlling 
the tornado situation, such as God or fate. Essays were scored higher on Threats to meaning if 
participants expressed the sense that the tornado might cause them to question life’s meaning or 
lose their sense of agency, whereas the Disruption of reality theme referred to concerns that the 
tornado would significantly alter the participant’s lifestyle or understanding of the world. 
 After the raters had independently coded all essays on the 1-5 scales, I examined the 
reliability between their ratings for each theme. Using the macro provided by Hayes and 
Krippendorff (2007), the average inter-rater reliability across all 10 themes was Krippendorff’s α 
= .64 (average Pearson’s r = .70). Krippendorff (2004) recommends a cut-off of α = .67 for 
modest reliability in exploratory analyses. I averaged the ratings of the two coders for each 
theme and use these composite scores in the analyses. 
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 Given the modest inter-rater reliability 
and the exploratory nature of the coding scheme, results pertaining to the essay codings should 
be considered tentative. 
 Guilt and fear. Participants were then given a separate packet of questionnaires, which 
began with the short version of the PANAS (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Participants 
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were asked to rate (on 1-5 scales) the extent to which they were feeling several different 
emotions right at that moment. They were not explicitly instructed to rate their feelings with 
relation to the video they had seen. Among the 20 emotions items were four items that 
constituted the guilt and fear index: “ashamed,” “guilty,” “scared,” and “afraid.” The items 
showed acceptable reliability (α = .64) and I averaged them to form a composite, with higher 
scores indicating greater feelings of guilt and fear. 
6
 
 World Assumptions Scale. Participants then completed the World Assumptions Scale 
(WAS; Janoff-Bulman, 1989). The WAS is designed to capture several key aspects of people’s 
worldviews, including assumptions about the benevolence and controllability of the world and 
other people as well as self-related attitudes, and it has been extensively validated in a variety of 
non-clinical and trauma-impacted samples (Janoff-Bulman, 1992). It consists of 32 items, with 8 
subscales (4 items each), answered on 1-7 scales (7 = strongly agree). Of particular interest for 
this study were the justice (α = .67), self-controllability, controllability, and self-esteem (α = .82) 
subscales. Because I was interested in assessing general perceptions of control, and did not have 
an a priori reason for distinguishing between personal and global control in this case, I combined 
the self-controllability and controllability subscales to form a composite perceived control index 
(α = .82). 
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Results 
Guilt and fear. I regressed guilt and fear scores onto video condition (tornado vs. no 
threat; dummy-coded), intrinsic religiosity (REL; continuous and centered), and their interaction. 
The predicted two-way interaction was significant, β = -.30, SE = .08, t(84) = -2.33, p = .02. I 
plotted the interaction in Figure 2 using 1 SD above (high-REL) and below (low-REL) the 
centered mean of REL (as recommended by Aiken & West, 1991).  
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Simple slopes analyses revealed that, among participants in the tornado condition, REL 
was positively associated with guilt and fear, β = .49, SE = .06, t(84) = 3.82, p < .001. In 
contrast, REL was not associated with guilt and fear in the no threat condition, β = .04, SE = .06, 
t(84) = .30, p = .77. Comparison of the predicted means at one SD above the centered REL mean 
showed that high-REL participants reported greater feelings of guilt and fear in the tornado 
compared to the no threat condition, β = .51, SE = .18, t(84) = 3.70, p < .001. However, video 
condition had no effect on guilt and fear feelings among low-REL participants, β = .05, SE = .18, 
t(84) = .34, p = .69. 
When regressing guilt and fear scores onto the EQ x video interaction, I obtained only a 
main effect of video β = .28, SE = .14, t(85) = 2.71, p < .01, such that participants scored higher 
in the tornado (M = 1.75, SD = .73) compared to the no threat condition (M = 1.38, SD = .50). No 
other effects were significant, ts < 1.5, ps > .17. 
Justice. I regressed control scores onto video condition (tornado vs. no threat; dummy-
coded), existential quest (EQ; continuous and centered), and their interaction. Only the predicted 
two-way interaction emerged, β = .46, SE = .27, t(84) = 3.01, p < .01. Again, I plotted the 
interaction in Figure 3 using 1 SD above (high-EQ) and below (low-EQ) the centered mean of 
EQ. 
Simple slopes analyses revealed that participants in the tornado condition evinced a non-
significantly trending positive association between EQ and justice scores, β = .19, SE = .18, t(84) 
= 1.36, p = .18. EQ was negatively associated with justice scores in the no threat condition, β = -
.44, SE = .20, t(84) = -2.85, p < .01. Comparison of the predicted means at one SD above the 
centered EQ mean showed that high-EQ participants reported greater perceived justice in the 
tornado compared to the no threat condition, β = .29, SE = .31, t(84) = 2.01, p = .05. By contrast, 
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among low-EQ participants, justice scores were lower in the natural disaster compared to the no 
threat condition, β = -.34, SE = .31, t(84) = -2.28, p = .03. 
There were no observed effects of regressing justice scores onto the REL x video 
interaction, ts < 1.5, ps > .17. 
Perceived control. Submitting perceived control scores to a parallel regression analysis 
revealed a significant two-way interaction, β = .40, SE = .25, t(84) = 2.62, p = .01. I plotted the 
interaction in Figure 4 using 1 SD above (high-EQ) and below (low-EQ) the centered mean of 
EQ.  
Simple slopes analyses revealed that, among participants in the tornado condition, EQ 
was positively associated with perceived control, β = .46, SE = .17, t(84) = 3.28, p = .001. In 
contrast, EQ did not predict perceived control in the no threat condition, β = -.08, SE = .18, t(84) 
= -.54, p = .59. Comparison of the predicted means at one SD above the centered EQ mean 
showed that high-EQ participants reported greater perceived control in the tornado compared to 
the no threat condition, β = .41, SE = .28, t(84) = 2.82, p < .01. However, video condition had no 
effect on perceived control among low-EQ participants, β = -.14, SE = .29, t(84) = -.92, p = .36. 
There were no observed effects of regressing perceived control scores onto the REL x 
video interaction, ts < 2, ps > .12. 
Self-esteem. Regressing self-esteem scores onto the EQ x video and REL x video 
interactions yielded only main effects for video, ts > 3.0, ps < .001, and no interactions, ts < 1, ps 
> .70. Self-esteem scores were higher in the tornado condition, M = 6.0, SD = 1.04, compared to 
the no threat condition, M = 5.16, SD = 1.29. 
 Mediation. To determine whether greater bolstering of perceived control among high-EQ 
participants in the tornado condition might be driven by simultaneous bolstering of justice 
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beliefs, I used Preacher and Hayes’ (2008) bootstrapping macro. I regressed perceived control 
scores onto the EQ x video interaction, with the main effects entered as covariates and justice 
scores entered as the proposed mediator. Five-thousand bootstrapping resamples were 
performed. The 95% CI for the indirect effect of the interaction on perceived control via the 
mediator of justice scores did not contain zero (.12, .75). The mediation model is presented in 
Figure 5. The model suggests that high-EQ individuals responded to the threat of the tornado by 
defensively bolstering perceptions that the world is a just place, in order to maintain perceived 
control, in line with Lerner’s (1980) original theory. 
 Coding data. I was further interested in exploring patterns of association between the 
cultural difference variables and themes that emerged in the tornado essays. To explore these 
issues, I first submitted the averaged rater scores for each of the ten coding themes to a factor 
analysis, using Maximum Likelihood Estimation and Promax rotation. Given the small sample 
size, despite model convergence, all results should be interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, the 
EFA and corresponding Scree plot suggested that the variables loaded onto three distinguishable 
factors. Variables were assigned to a factor if they loaded at .40 or higher on only that factor.  
 The themes of Concern with suffering of self vs. Concern with suffering of others, 
Responsibility for others, and Self as source of strength loaded on the first factor; Others as 
source of strength and Concern with establishing secondary control loaded on the second; and 
Threats to meaning, Disruption of reality, and Loss of property in sentimental terms loaded on 
the third. In light of prior social science research on and first-hand accounts of tornados (e.g., 
Haney, 2009; Taylor et al., 1970; Wolfenstein, 1977), these factors were substantively 
interpretable. I labeled the first factor Self-reliance, representing a relative prioritization of the 
self’s experience during the tornado; the second factor External support, representing reliance on 
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family, community, or religious sources during the storm and its aftermath; and the third factor 
Meaninglessness, representing a concern that the storm would threaten one’s worldview and 
sever important connections to one’s personal history (e.g., the loss of personally significant 
property). 
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 To explore the associations between the factors that emerged and the cultural difference 
variables of primary interest in the study, I created composite scores for each factor by averaging 
the relevant loading variables (for the Self-reliance factor, I reverse-scored the first two themes, 
such that higher scores indicated greater reliance on or concern with the self). I then examined 
the correlations (among participants in the tornado video condition) between intrinsic religiosity, 
existential quest, and the three factors. Intrinsic religiosity was positively associated with 
External support, r = .32, p = .03, while existential quest scores were positively associated with 
Meaninglessness, r = .30, p = .05. Furthermore, the Self-reliance factor was also positively 
associated with Meaninglessness, r = .29, p = .05. No other significant correlations emerged.  
Discussion 
 Study 1 provided basic support for the DISA/DESA distinction in culturally derived 
threat orientations. More devoutly religious Undergraduates showed elements of a DISA 
orientation: Rather than responding to the threat of a natural disaster with meaninglessness angst, 
they reported heightened affect, included elevated feelings of guilt, and turned towards sources 
of external support—such as family, community members, or God—for assistance in the 
hypothetical disaster situation. By contrast, Undergraduates with more secular proclivities—as 
evidenced by high existential quest scores—reacted in ways characteristic of a DESA 
orientation. Rather than show elevated guilt, these participants demonstrated signs of 
meaninglessness angst in their reflections on the hypothetical tornado. They defended against 
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this angst by bolstering their perceived control via an abstract contingency formula – the belief in 
a just world. In line with a DESA orientation, these more secular participants relied on 
individualistic, rather than external or community-based defenses.  
 Although the total pattern of results provides initial evidence for the role of culture in 
conditioning threat experience, there are several limitations to these data. These limitations stem 
from the fact that cultural orientations were assessed in what is in fact a fairly homogenous 
sample and a subculture in its own right, namely, university Undergraduates. Although 
Undergraduates can clearly possess varying cultural tendencies—as evidenced by the divergent 
threat-response patterns as a function of religiosity-secularism—the individual difference 
measures used in this study are limited by a primary focus on the subjective or symbolic aspects 
of culture. Although Undergraduates may vary in their belief systems, they share a common 
daily environment and set of normative practices (such as, for instance, periodic required 
participation in psychology experiments), and they are exposed to many of the same influences 
from the wider global culture. This is supported by the observation that, although there were 
systematic differences in the responses of more religious versus more secularized participants, 
there were also certain commonalities across all participants. Most importantly, participants 
defensively bolstered self-esteem in response to the tornado video, regardless of religiosity. This 
suggests that although more religious Undergraduates have DISA inclinations, Undergraduate 
culture on the whole has a DESA orientation: individual self-esteem is a primary buffer in the 
face of threats. 
 To examine more thoroughly the influence of culture on threat experience, it was 
necessary to conduct a study connecting variation in symbolic aspects of culture (i.e., religious 
meaning systems) to their grounding in social orientation (i.e., collectivism-individualism). 
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Accordingly, Study 2 examines the pattern of threat orientation evidenced by Undergraduates in 
comparison to that of two other subcultural groups. Specifically, I compared Undergraduate 
students to two very distinct subcultures selected as representative of “pure” DISA and DESA 
orientations.   
Study 2 
 It will be argued that Undergraduates—despite considerable variation in beliefs, as found 
in Study 1—generally represent a vertical/utilitarian individualist culture, characterized by 
moderate levels of religiosity (rather than strong tendencies toward orthodoxy or secularism). On 
average, then, members of this culture should evidence patterns of vertically individualist DESA 
orientation: they should experience anxiety more commonly than guilt, and they should also be 
especially oriented towards death angst. They primarily defend against these threats by relying 
on a sense of their own self-worth. Study 2 tests this pattern in Undergraduates while 
simultaneously examining the different threat orientations of two other subcultural groups: 
Holdeman Mennonites and Unitarian Universalists. Holdeman Mennonites are collectivist in 
social orientation and orthodoxly religious; accordingly, they should demonstrate a prototypic 
DISA pattern of orientation towards guilt and away from meaninglessness angst. Unitarian 
Universalists, by contrast, are members of a non-creedal religion that represents one version of 
secular possibility in modern culture. They are best characterized as horizontal/expressive 
individualists, and should evince a prototypic DESA pattern of orientation towards anxiety and 
away from condemnation angst. 
 Before describing the quasi-experimental study conducted with members of these three 
groups, it is necessary to provide more background regarding each of their subcultures. 
Holdeman Mennonites 
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Members of the Church of God in Christ, Mennonite, are typically referred to as 
Holdeman Mennonites after their founder, John Holdeman, who broke away from the Mennonite 
Church in 1859 over what he perceived to be a relaxing of traditions and a compromise with 
worldliness among the Mennonites (Weaver, 1997). The Holdeman Mennonites now number 
over 21,000, with several congregations in the Midwestern part of the United States.  
The Holdeman Mennonites possess a strong sense of Christian faith that guides all their 
beliefs and daily behaviors. An important aspect of the Holdeman faith is the principle of 
“nonconformity to the world” (Church of God in Christ, Mennonite, 2008). The Holdeman 
Mennonites perceive that the world (i.e., mainstream commercialized society, especially modern 
culture in the United States) is characterized by widespread materialism and numerous 
opportunities for pursuing individualistic or selfish goals and desires. It is stressed that 
individuals must remain true to the Church and the principles of Christian faith in order to 
maintain separation from the temptations and sins of the world. This viewpoint does not imply 
complete isolation from the world or its technological and financial developments, but it does 
advocate a strong commitment to the Holdeman community, and avoidance of worldly activities 
such as political or military involvement.  
 The Holdemans would be considered culturally and religiously conservative or 
fundamentalist by the standards of most social scientists (e.g., Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992). 
It should also be noted that most other Mennonites consider the Holdemans quite conservative 
(Dyck, 1993). Barclay (1967) devised a scale for ranking different Anabaptist groups on their 
degree of “plainness,” with higher ratings being associated with a stronger negative reaction to 
various individualist or materialist behaviors (e.g., watching television, marrying a non-Church 
member, wearing decorative attire, etc.), as well as stricter enforcement of church discipline (i.e., 
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shunning of apostates). Out of 7 relevant denominations ranked by Barclay, only the Old Order 
Amish ranked higher than the Holdemans on the scale. 
 There are a number of ways in which Holdemans qualify as an orthodoxly religious, 
collectivist subculture. They place great importance on living together in harmony, affection, and 
mutual support with their family and other members of their local church community (the 
“brotherhood”), and are averse to self-interested pursuits. Their culture is transmitted through 
narrow socialization practices, which involve communal participation in childrearing, exclusive 
attendance at local church schools, and avoidance of higher education except in special 
circumstances (Boynton, 1986). Congregations negotiate local normative practices, which 
typically involve unspoken rules for plain attire (especially for women) and the avoidance of any 
objects, entertainments, or activities that might be construed as unrewarding, gluttonous, 
materialistic, or promoting of carnality or selfishness (Arthur, 1998). The Holdemans are not 
opposed, however, to the use of technologies or the purchase of commodities that facilitate 
personal comfort, social communication with family or other “brethren,” or enhanced 
productivity and labor. When an individual deviates from local norms for behavior, a lengthy 
process of reintegrative reprimanding is set in motion which may ultimately result in 
excommunication and shunning behavior from the community and family members (Barclay, 
1967; Hiebert, 1973). Excommunicated Holdemans are often reaccepted back into the Church 
after a short ritual of repentance.
 
 In the past, the Holdemans have upheld their tight culture and strong sense of shared faith 
by isolating themselves to a considerable degree from mainstream society, a goal that has been 
greatly facilitated by their traditionally agricultural lifestyle. Processes of capitalism, 
globalization, and technological and media development and infiltration have made it 
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increasingly difficult for Holdemans both to isolate themselves from the ideas and influences of 
commercialized society and to maintain agricultural careers (Hiebert, 1973). In lieu of the 
farmsteading of their forefathers, many contemporary Holdemans have adopted alternate ways of 
earning a living that remain rooted in either agriculture or craftsmanship, such as operating farm 
supply stores, restaurants, or floral shops; raising poultry; carpentry; oil extraction; and so on. 
Perhaps most critical for contemporary Holdemans is the struggle to maintain economic 
insulation and self-sufficiency in a world driven by market capitalism. They have devised a 
variety of practices for avoiding too much integration into the mainstream economy (Barclay, 
1969). These include—in addition to unspoken bans on the purchase of certain kinds of 
materialist commodities—resistances to purchasing commercial insurance, accruing debt, 
becoming too involved in business ventures with non-Holdemans, using credit cards, and 
investing in the stock market (e.g., Boynton, 1986). 
Unitarian Universalists 
Unitarian Universalism has historical roots in various strands of Reformation-era 
Unitarian Christianity—which rejected the doctrine of the Holy Trinity and advocated religious 
tolerance—, as well as Universalism—an open form of Christianity that developed in parallel 
with 18
th
 Century Enlightenment Deism and American Transcendentalism (Greenwood & Harris, 
2011; McKanan, 2013). In general, the three cornerstones of Enlightenment idealism – the 
sanctity of the individual, the shift from “revelation” to “reason” in religiosity, and the Utopian 
call for massive social reform—remain an adequate summation of Unitarian Universalist beliefs 
(Leitgeb, 2009; Tapp, 1973). In the United States, the Unitarian and Universalist churches 
consolidated in 1961 with the formation of the Unitarian Universalist Association. There are 
currently 161,000 members of the Unitarian Universalist Association (McKanan, 2013).   
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 Unitarian Universalism is considered by many (but not all) of its adherents to be a 
religion; yet it represents the near-extreme of possibilities for religiosity-secularism in the 
contemporary age. As a leading liberal church, this faith eschews many traditional religious 
concepts. For example, Unitarian Universalists tend not to believe in immortality (Tapp, 1973), 
and many also find the idea of a personified God to be not only false or misleading but also 
potentially harmful (Greenwood & Harris, 2011). Furthermore, it is technically possible to be a 
Unitarian Universalist but also belong to any other denomination or belief system; for example, 
one can be a Unitarian Buddhist, a Unitarian Muslim, a Unitarian atheist, and so on. In short, 
Unitarian Universalism is an ethical rather than a creedal religion (Greenwood & Harris, 2011): 
its practitioners are united by a set of moral convictions, rather than an explicit belief system. 
One of the few “creedal” elements of Unitarian Universalism is the set of seven principles which 
its members follow (Buehrens & Church, 1998). These principles may be summarized thus: 
respect for individual dignity is to be maintained through justice and equality; tolerance of others 
and their viewpoints is essential; truth and meaning should always be sought; we are part of a 
world community and connected to our natural environment. 
The principles demonstrate that Unitarian Universalists have a fairly abstract belief 
system. Supporting this, members of this denomination demonstrate “postconventional morality” 
(defined according to Kohlberg’s stages of moral development) compared to members of 
fundamentalist religions (Ernsberger & Manaster, 1981). Their beliefs are abstract enough to 
accommodate a variety of individual personalities and perspectives. Indeed, the denomination 
may be characterized as individualism attached to and instantiated in a worldview, the essence of 
horizontal/expressive individualism. It represents an attempt to ground individualism in a local 
and global community; liberal theologians affiliated with the denomination stress the idea of the 
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“social self” (Rasor, 2008). A 1960s questionnaire study of 80 different Unitarian Universalist 
churches and fellowships found that one of the more prominent impacts of conversion to a 
Unitarian Universalist community is an increased integration between personal values and 
social-ethical values (Tapp, 1973). This consonance between personal conviction and a social 
orientation is reflected in Unitarian Universalists’ deep concern with generativity—connecting to 
subsequent generations and making a lasting contribution to their lives (McAdams, 2006). 
The religiosity of Unitarian Universalists is expressed not only through their common 
moral code, but through the enactment of community in periodic rituals. Unitarian Universalists 
practice a model of congregational polity (Greenwood & Harris, 2011), and the organization, 
atmosphere, and emphases of congregations varies considerably; for example, some 
congregations have ministers, while others do not. Typically, most congregations hold Sunday 
services that are not structurally dissimilar from those of many U.S. mainline Christian 
denominations (Elliott & Hayward, 2007). However, Sunday gatherings and sermons tend to 
emphasize intellectual issues and social justice activism, rather than theological content. 
Congregants are encouraged to play an active role in shaping the structure and content of church 
activities and worship (Leitgeb, 2009).  
In clear contrast to the Holdeman Mennonites, Unitarian Universalists come from a 
variety of backgrounds, and do not share a particular type of career or lifestyle. The 
denomination is sometimes characterized as a “religion of converts,” because the majority of 
Unitarian Universalists are not “born” or socialized into the religion, but rather adopt it in young 
or middle adulthood, often after youthful experiences with a different religion (Leitgeb, 2009; 
Tapp, 1973). However, common characteristics are found in urban living and higher education. 
Compared to many other denominations, Unitarian Universalists not only overwhelmingly tend 
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to have college educations, but they quite often have academic or university-affiliated careers 
(Tapp, 1973). Some evidence tentatively suggests that better educated Unitarian Universalists are 
the most adept at deriving a sense of personal well-being from their seemingly incoherent or 
open-ended belief system (Elliott & Hayward, 2007).  
Undergraduates 
 Admittedly, the identity of “Undergraduate” is a distinctly different form of social 
identity from that of Holdeman Mennonite or Unitarian Universalist. The latter two groups are 
organized on the basis of a religious identity, which in the case of the isolationist Holdemans 
may also serve as an individual’s most important identification, but which in the case of the more 
cosmopolitan Unitarian Universalists may be only one source of identity among others. 
Undergraduates are grouped together on the basis of a common occupational or role-based 
identity, one that is also recognized as inherently temporary. However, this does not imply that 
Undergraduates do not constitute a unique subculture with particular characteristics. Because of 
social psychologists’ tendency to rely on Undergraduate samples in their research and generalize 
from findings with these samples, as well as their own nearness to Undergraduate culture, they 
are perhaps disinclined to think of Undergraduates as representing a “culture.” Nevertheless, it is 
clear that they do; what is more, as has recently been argued, Undergraduates constitute a 
cultural group that has many unique and extreme tendencies with comparison to much of the rest 
of the world population (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). 
Naturally, Undergraduates differ from members of many other cultural groups— 
including the others included in Study 2—in terms of their restricted age range and common life-
stage. But age differences can be accounted for in statistical analyses, and Undergraduate culture 
differs from that of the other two groups in the present study in a variety of additional, 
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theoretically meaningful ways. In particular, the fact that Undergraduates are grouped together 
only by a common role identity—and one that places them in a context of performative 
competition with all other members of their group—makes them an ideal instantiation of a 
vertically individualist cultural context. Although Undergraduates can certainly embrace their 
local college identity—and they often do so to a considerable extent (e.g., Cialdini et al., 1976)—
the typical college environment affords a highly individualistic self-concept (Stephens, Fryberg, 
Markus, Johnson, & Covarrubias, 2012). In college, students often experimentally join and leave 
multiple groups, acquiring the sense of a “protean self” (Lifton, 1987) with fragmentary 
allegiances that ultimately reinforces their sense of personal uniqueness (Simmel, 1955). College 
students most often conceive of themselves as unique individuals subject to continual evaluation 
and intragroup comparison—the epitome of vertical individualism. 
 Scholars have presented evidence that the conversion of the Undergraduate university 
environment to a pure vertical individualist setting has been, in many ways, a deliberate part of 
the neoliberal agenda of politicians and the capitalist and managerial classes of the world 
economy over the past 35 years (Duménil & Lévy, 2011; Harvey, 2005; Ratner, 2013). 
9
 In this 
sense, the university environment is not only reflective of broader cultural movements in the 
United States towards increased vertical individualism, but can even be seen as a kind of 
laboratory in which vertical individualist ideals are created, tested, and transmitted. Even prior to 
the rise of neoliberalism as a dominant cultural force, college students perceived individualism 
and competitive assertiveness to be important aspects of their social role (Reitzes, 1980). These 
elements have been exacerbated by the trend, in recent decades, for universities in the United 
States to either be directly privatized or commercialized, or to adopt models of 
privatization/commercialization. This results in Undergraduates increasingly viewing their 
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college experience in commodified terms: The university and its instructors are providing a 
product (a degree) that will facilitate their future career goals (Tomlinson & Lipsitz, 2013).  
However, Undergraduates also view the quality of the product they obtain through their 
education as contingent on their own performance, meaning they have been socialized to 
understand that institutions of education submit them to an “order of rank,” an abstract bell curve 
on which they are hoping to achieve the highest possible score (Foucault, 1977). Indeed, 
Undergraduates know that they themselves are the product being produced: “…every piece of 
knowledge one acquires can be interpreted and assessed as a skill, an aspect of oneself that can 
be considered productive by prospective employers. Skills thus become a form of self-marketing, 
and students readily come to imagine themselves as bundles of skills” (Urciuoli, 2010). 
Undergraduates are, throughout the duration of their college careers, consistently evaluating 
themselves both against an abstract internal standard and the performances of their peers, all in 
the pursuit of ultimate personal success. Their daily lives are marked by a high degree of the 
“status anxiety” typical of vertical individualist settings (de Botton, 2004). In addition to periodic 
bouts of hedonistic or materialist excess, Undergraduates cope with this anxiety by employing a 
variety of self-serving biases acquired through their individualist socialization (Griffin, 2004; 
Vaillancourt, 2013). 
 Of course, the Undergraduate experience is not only one of vertical individualism. It is 
also a liminal cultural context (Nathan, 2006), a prototypic transitional period during which 
students are encouraged to adopt and discard various identities in a quest for self-knowledge, 
resonant with horizontal/expressive individualist ideals. Yet evidence suggests that even this 
self-exploratory aspect of Undergraduate culture is increasingly marked by a kind of cynicism 
and competitive edge. As one ethnographer of Undergraduates wrote: 
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…undergraduates did not ignore the [social] world in conceptualizing the self…They 
simply saw it as a different place, requiring a different, more artificial social self. The 
true self had to disguise itself in the wider world, they believed. It had to wear masks. It 
had to play roles. It had to manipulate other people. Personal development of the sort that 
most students expected to accomplish in college was thus a complicated business…you 
had to come to know, or to construct, your “real” personal identity as you came of age. At 
the same time, you had to polish the practical skills of masking this same true self in the 
public world. You had to refine your ability to influence others if you wanted to get 
ahead in life (Moffatt, 1989, p. 41; cf. Sullivan, Landau, & Young, 2013). 
 To summarize the foregoing discussion of the three populations involved in Study 2, they 
were recruited because they represent different ideal-types of cultural threat orientation. The 
Holdeman Mennonites, religiously orthodox and collectivist in social orientation, emphasize 
behaving in accordance with local and religious rules of conduct, and trace the origin of suffering 
to human sinfulness and selfish behavior. Accordingly, I predicted that they would demonstrate a 
prototypic DISA threat orientation: they should tend to experience threat in terms of guilt, and 
show low levels of meaninglessness anxiety. They should defend against threats by engaging in 
reparative, conciliatory behaviors, and by relying on their belief in God’s control. Unitarian 
Universalists, at the opposite end of the spectrum, are characterized by a quest religious 
orientation and approximate the ideal of horizontal individualism. I predicted that they would 
demonstrate a prototypic DESA pattern: their levels of guilt proneness would not be as high, and 
instead they should show high levels of self-esteem and belief in the goodness of humanity and 
the world. Because they see truth as open-ended and the future as uncertain, Unitarian 
Universalists should tend to experience threat in terms of anxiety, but be oriented away from 
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condemnation anxiety. Finally, Undergraduates also should represent a DESA pattern, but of the 
kind associated with vertical individualism.  I predicted that they would tend to see the world as 
a more random and less benevolent place, and that they would be oriented not only towards 
anxiety but towards death angst as a consequence of their relatively high level of vertical 
individualism. Undergraduates should also evince primary reliance on self-esteem as a culturally 
derived defense against threat. Additional information on the cultural differences between the 
three groups, especially pertaining to their religious beliefs, is available in Appendix B. 
Method 
 Participants were 28 Holdeman Mennonites (9 female), 29 KU Undergraduate students 
(17 female), and 24 Unitarian Universalists (15 female, 1 unidentified). 
10
 Average ages within 
groups were M = 50 years, SD = 19 years for the Holdemans; M = 18.5 years, SD = 1 year for the 
Undergraduates; and M = 65 years, SD = 14 years for the Unitarian Universalists. 
11
 All 
Holdeman participants belonged to the same central Kansas congregation, and data were 
collected from these participants in a single sitting at their church building. Similarly, all 
Unitarian Universalists belonged to the same congregation, located in a major Kansas city. 
About 1/3 of Unitarian Universalist participants completed the survey at their fellowship 
building, while the remaining participants completed packets at home and mailed them to the 
experimenter. Data from the KU Undergraduates were collected in a single sitting in a large KU 
classroom.  
At the beginning of all sessions (or in instruction sheets in the case of Unitarian 
Universalists who completed the survey at home), it was stressed that whenever they 
encountered the word community in the survey, participants were to think specifically about the 
local community on the basis of which they had been recruited. In other words, Holdemans 
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thought about their congregation as a whole, Unitarian Universalists similarly thought about their 
local fellowship, and Undergraduates thought about the Undergraduate community at their 
university. It was made clear to all participants that other potentially ambiguous terms 
encountered throughout the survey (e.g., “God,” “faith,” “people”) should be interpreted in 
whatever way seemed most natural to them. At the beginning of the survey, Undergraduates and 
Unitarian Universalists indicated their religious affiliation. The majority of Undergraduates 
identified as “Christian” or “Catholic” (a few identified as “non-religious”), while the majority of 
Unitarian Universalists identified as “Unitarian Universalist” (a few identified as “atheist”). 
Cultural variables. After answering a few demographic questions, participants 
responded to several items pertaining to the cultural factors of primary interest: Religiosity and 
Collectivism-individualism. Religiosity measures included the intrinsic religiosity (reduced to 
seven items) and existential quest (reduced to eight items) scales used in Study 1, as well as one 
additional item: “Do you believe that you yourself, or that God controls your life and the events 
in it?” (1 = I entirely control my life, 4 = God has some control over my life, 7 = God entirely 
controls my life). Social orientation measures were adapted from the dimensional individualism-
collectivism scale (Singelis et al., 1995), with three items each intended to assess vertical 
collectivism, horizontal collectivism, vertical individualism, and horizontal individualism. For a 
list of all items for the measures used in this study (with the exception of those used in Study 1), 
see Appendix C. With the exception of the God-control item, participants responded to all items 
in this section of the survey on 1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree scales. 
 Worldview components and defensive structures. Participants then completed 
measures designed to assess more specific components of their worldview, which, in addition to 
the more general belief systems of religiosity-secularism and collectivism-individualism, were 
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hypothesized to act as culturally derived defensive structures against existential threat. 
Worldview components were assessed using a modified version of the WAS (Janoff-Bulman, 
1989; also assessed in Study 1), with three items each assessing the components of 
controllability (α = .63), self-controllability (α = .52), justice (α = .52), randomness (α = .45), 
benevolence of the world (α = .70), benevolence of people (α = .33), and luck (α = .71), and with 
four items assessing the component of self-esteem (α = .79). The low reliabilities observed for 
some of the subscales were probably due to the fact that the original four items were reduced to 
three. Because of the theoretical specificity of the WAS subscales and their prior validation 
(Janoff-Bulman, 1992), the separate scales were nevertheless maintained.  
Besides the WAS components, I assessed one additional culturally derived defensive 
structure, namely the tendency to engage in reparative behavior after a guilt-inducing situation. 
Specifically, participants were asked to recall a time when they had said or done something to 
offend or harm someone whom they cared about. They then responded to the item, “I made very 
strong efforts to apologize and reconcile with this person.” Participants responded to all items in 
this section of the survey on 1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree scales. 
 Threat orientations. I assessed the lower-level existential threat experiences of guilt and 
anxiety using previously validated measures. Specifically, guilt was assessed using five items 
from the Guilt and Shame Proneness Scale (Cohen, Wolf, Panter, & Insko, 2011). This scale 
presents individuals with hypothetical situations in which they might experience guilt or shame. 
Participants rate the negative affect they would feel in each imagined situation without the words 
guilt or shame being directly mentioned. All responses were given on 1 = Very unlikely, 7 = 
Very likely scales. Although the scale is designed to separately measure feelings of guilt and 
shame, as well as behavioral tendencies associated with each emotion, for purposes of this study 
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I was interested only in creating a generalized assessment of guilt. I therefore used five guilt and 
shame feelings items from the measure, selecting scenarios that would be equally applicable to 
each group, and created a composite guilt measure (α = .70). 
 Anxiety was assessed using two kinds of items. First, because anxiety typically manifests 
as feelings of uncertainty about the future, I administered four items adopted from a previous 
measure (Sullivan, Landau, & Rothschild, 2010) which assess anxious concern over potential 
future risks (and to which participants responded on the scale 1 = Not anxious at all, 4 = 
Neutral, 7 = Very anxious). However, lower-level anxiety can also manifest as a general feeling 
of malaise or emptiness when one feels that the goals and objects in one’s environment are not 
inherently meaningful (Tillich, 1952). Accordingly, I also administered the two items from the 
emptiness subscale of the Existential Anxiety Questionnaire (Weems et al., 2004), designed to 
assess Tillich’s typology of existential threat, on which the present model is based (see also 
Sullivan et al., 2012). Participants responded to these items on the scale 1 = Strongly disagree, 7 
= Strongly agree. The six items were averaged to create a composite measure of proclivity 
towards anxiety (α = .63). 
 Experiences of higher-level or “ultimate” threat are more difficult to assess empirically 
and ethically, as opposed to the temporary threats that manifest in concrete situations of guilt and 
anxiety. Nevertheless, to gain a preliminary understanding of how these groups differentially 
experience and defend against experiences of angst, I administered the two-item death (r = .41, p 
< .001), meaninglessness (r = .38, p < .001), and condemnation (r = .45, p < .001) subscales of 
the Existential Anxiety Questionnaire (Weems et al., 2004). Responses to all angst measures 
were given on 1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree scales. 
Results 
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Data analysis strategy 
In general, the purpose of this study was to investigate the relationships between cultural 
variables, worldview components, and threat orientations in three different subcultures. The 
cultural variables—measures of religiosity and collectivism-individualism—were treated as 
“descriptive” variables, in order to validate that the three groups in fact fit the expected pattern. 
Because the groups were religiously diverse, and because Undergraduates and Unitarian 
Universalists were expected to represent separate forms of individualism, the cultural variables 
were first subjected to exploratory factor analysis, and then group differences on the resulting 
factors were tested. 
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The worldview components/defensive structures and threat orientations were treated 
more as “outcome” variables. Due to the number of variables and items involved, as well as their 
theoretical specificity, factor analyses were not performed for these items; rather, composite 
scores were constructed for each variable on the basis of prior theory and measurement 
validation. In order to reduce the number of analyses and simplify presentation, for these 
measures planned contrasts were conducted rather than omnibus one-way ANOVAs. The 
contrasts were planned based on my analysis and preliminary inspection of the data from the 
cultural variables. Specifically, the following predictions were tested: 
1. Since the Holdeman Mennonites were expected to score high on collectivism and 
orthodox religiosity, and thus fit the profile of a paradigmatic DISA culture, they were 
expected to score higher than the other two groups on controllability, guilt, and 
reparative behavior. They were also expected to score lower than the other two groups 
on anxiety and meaninglessness angst. 
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2. Since the Undergraduates were expected to score high on vertical individualism and 
moderately on the religiosity measures, and thus fit the profile of a utilitarian DESA 
culture with passive nihilism, they were expected to score higher than the other two 
groups on randomness, self-controllability, justice, and death angst. 
3. Since the Unitarian Universalists were expected to score high on horizontal 
individualism and existential quest, and thus fit the profile of an expressive DESA culture 
with active nihilism, they were expected to score higher than the other two groups on 
self-esteem, benevolence of the world, and benevolence of people. They were also 
expected to score lower than the other two groups on condemnation angst. 
All analyses controlled for age, with the exception of within-group correlations (see 
Footnote 11). All reported means are estimated marginal means controlling for age. For 
conceptual overviews of the results, see Tables 1 and 2. For all mean differences between the 
groups on all variables, see Tables 3, 4, and 5. 
Cultural variables 
 Religiosity. To determine how the measures of religiosity related to one another in this 
religiously diverse sample, I submitted scores on all religiosity measures (existential quest, 
intrinsic religiosity, and God-control) to an exploratory factor analysis, using Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation and Promax rotation. The analysis and corresponding Scree plot 
suggested that the variables loaded onto three distinguishable factors. The eight existential quest 
items loaded at .45 or higher on only one factor, so I created composite existential quest scores 
(α = .87). Among the other items, two intrinsic religiosity items that mentioned “God,” the God-
control item, and the item, “My faith sometimes restricts my actions” loaded at .80 or higher on 
only one factor. I averaged responses across these items to create an orthodox religiosity index (α 
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= .95). The four remaining items – “My faith involves all my life,” “In my life I experience the 
presence of the divine,” “I try hard to carry my religion over into all my other dealings in life,” 
and “My religious beliefs are really what lie behind my whole approach to life” – loaded at .80 
or higher on only one factor, and I averaged responses to these items to create an independent 
intrinsic religiosity index (α = .94). Across the entire sample, existential quest correlated 
negatively with orthodox and intrinsic religiosity, rs > -.60, ps < .001, and the latter two factors 
correlated at r = .77, p < .001. 
 Orthodox religiosity. I submitted orthodox religiosity scores to a between-subjects 
(Holdeman Mennonites vs. Undergraduates vs. Unitarian Universalists) ANCOVA, with age 
entered as the covariate, and obtained a significant result, F(2, 76) = 107.81, p < .001, partial-η
2
 
= .74. For means of the groups on all cultural variables, see Table 3. Pairwise comparisons 
(Fisher’s LSD) revealed that Holdemans had higher orthodox religiosity scores compared to 
Undergraduates, p < .001, and Unitarian Universalists, p <.001. Undergraduates also displayed 
greater orthodox religiosity relative to Unitarian Universalists, p < .01. 
 Intrinsic religiosity. Submitting intrinsic religiosity scores to the same analysis also 
yielded a significant result, F(2, 76) = 34.02, p < .001, partial-η
2
 = .47. Pairwise comparisons 
suggested that Holdemans had higher intrinsic religiosity scores compared to Undergraduates, p 
< .001, and Unitarian Universalists, p < .001. The latter two groups did not differ in intrinsic 
religiosity, p = .97. 
 Existential quest. The groups also differed in existential quest scores, F(2, 76) = 67.21, p 
< .001, partial-η
2
 = .64. Unitarian Universalists had higher quest scores than Undergraduates, p = 
.04, and Holdemans, p < .001. Undergraduates also had higher quest scores compared to 
Holdemans, p < .001. 
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 Collectivism-individualism. In order to check the factor structure of the dimensional 
individualism-collectivism scale (Singelis et al., 1995), I performed an EFA (using Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation and Promax rotation) on the vertical collectivism, horizontal collectivism, 
vertical individualism and horizontal individualism items. The analysis and corresponding Scree 
plot suggested that the variables loaded onto only three (rather than the hypothesized four) 
distinguishable factors. Specifically, all six collectivism items loaded at .50 or higher on only 
one factor, so rather than creating separate vertical and horizontal collectivism indices, I created 
a single collectivism composite (α = .80). The EFA suggested meaningful differentiation 
between the two dimensions of individualism, however, so I created separate vertical (α = .55) 
and horizontal individualism indices (α = .50). 
 Collectivism. The groups differed in collectivism, F(2, 76) = 48.54, p < .001, partial-η
2
 = 
.56. Holdemans were more collectivist than Undergraduates, p < .001, and Unitarian 
Universalists, p < .001. The latter two groups did not differ in collectivism, p = .28. 
 Vertical individualism. The groups also differed in vertical individualism, F(2, 76) = 
3.21, p = .05, partial-η
2
 = .08. Undergraduates were more vertically individualist than 
Holdemans, p = .04, and Unitarian Universalists, p = .01. The latter two groups did not differ in 
vertical individualism, p = .17. 
 Horizontal individualism. The groups differed in horizontal individualism, F(2, 76) = 
17.73, p < .001, partial-η
2
 = .32. Holdemans were less horizontally individualist than 
Undergraduates, p < .001, and Unitarian Universalists, p < .001. The latter two groups did not 
differ in horizontal individualism, p = .95. 
 Generally supporting my theoretical analysis, orthodox religiosity was positively 
correlated across the entire sample with collectivism, r = .70, p < .001, and negatively correlated 
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with horizontal individualism, r = -.48, p < .001. Conversely, existential quest was positively 
correlated across the entire sample with horizontal individualism, r = .59, p < .001, and 
negatively correlated with collectivism, r = -.57, p < .001.  
Worldview components and defensive structures 
 Controllability. A planned contrast (see data analysis strategy above) found that 
Holdemans perceived the world to be more controlled (M = 4.98, SD = .97) compared to the 
other two groups (M = 3.91, SD = 1.19), F(1, 76) = 16.90, p < .001. For means of the groups on 
all worldview components and defensive structures, see Table 4. 
 Randomness. A planned contrast found that Undergraduates perceived the world to be 
more random (M = 5.71, SD = 1.02) compared to the other two groups (M = 4.23, SD = 1.14), 
F(1, 76) = 14.23, p < .001. 
 Benevolence of the world. A planned contrast found that Unitarian Universalists 
perceived the world to be more benevolent (M = 5.46, SD = 1.42) compared to the other two 
groups (M = 4.61, SD = 1.18), F(1, 76) = 4.61, p = .04. 
 Benevolence of people. A planned contrast found that Unitarian Universalists also 
perceived human nature in general to be more benevolent (M = 5.48, SD = .78) compared to the 
other two groups (M = 4.43, SD = 1.08), F(1, 76) = 10.92, p < .01.  
 Self-esteem. A planned contrast found that Unitarian Universalists had higher self-esteem 
(M = 6.16, SD = 1.00) compared to the other two groups (M = 5.01, SD = 1.35), F(1, 76) = 8.30, 
p < .01.  
 No other significant effects were found on the three remaining WAS subscales. 
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 Reparative behavior. Holdemans also scored higher (M = 6.77, SD = .68) on the measure 
of reparative behavior compared to the other two groups (M = 5.13, SD = 2.00), F(1, 70) = 14.04, 
p < .001. 
Threat orientations 
 Guilt. A planned contrast found that Holdemans had a greater proclivity towards feelings 
of guilt and shame (M = 6.58, SD = .59) compared to the other two groups (M = 5.84, SD = 
1.06), F(1, 76) = 11.42, p < .01. For means of the groups on all threat orientations, see Table 5. 
Also supporting predictions, only among the Holdemans was there a significant positive 
correlation between guilt and reparative behavior, r = .53, p < .01 (Undergraduates: r = .21, 
Unitarian Universalists: r = -.24), suggesting that reparation and reconciliation are culturally 
derived buffers against guilt among the members of this group.  
 Anxiety. A planned contrast found that Holdemans showed less proclivity towards 
feelings of anxiety (M = 3.94, SD = .93) compared to the other two groups (M = 4.86, SD = .92), 
F(1, 77) = 17.90, p < .001. To verify the prediction that both Undergraduates and Unitarian 
Universalists would be oriented towards anxiety, I confirmed that these two groups did not differ 
in anxiety scores, p = .74. Also supporting predictions, only among Undergraduates was anxiety 
significantly negatively correlated with self-esteem, r = -.46, p = .01 (Holdemans: r = -.31, 
Unitarian Universalists: r = .82); while only among Unitarian Universalists was anxiety 
significantly negatively correlated with horizontal individualism, r = -.52, p = .01 (Holdemans: r 
= .29, Undergraduates: r = -.18). These findings suggest that self-esteem and an expressively 
individualistic worldview are culturally derived buffers against anxiety amongst Undergraduates 
and Unitarian Universalists, respectively. 
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 Death angst. A planned contrast found that Undergraduates showed a greater level of 
death angst (M = 4.44, SD = 1.62) compared to the other two groups (M = 2.43, SD = 1.29), F(1, 
77) = 14.70, p < .001. Also supporting predictions, only among Undergraduates was self-esteem 
negatively correlated with death angst, r = - .48, p < .01 (Holdemans: r = -.11, Unitarian 
Universalists: r = .15), suggesting that self-esteem is a culturally derived buffer against death 
angst among members of this group. By contrast, only among Holdemans was orthodox 
religiosity negatively correlated with death angst, r = -.59, p < .01 (Undergraduates: r = -.01, 
Unitarian Universalists: r = -.04), suggesting that the members of this group are buffered against 
death angst by their religious beliefs. All three within-group correlations between vertical 
individualism and death angst were significant and positive (Holdemans: r = .39, p = .04, 
Undergraduates: r = .55, p < .01, Unitarian Universalists: r = .45, p = .03).  
 Meaninglessness angst. A planned contrast found that Holdemans showed a lower level 
of meaninglessness angst (M = 1.25, SD = .42) compared to the other two groups (M = 2.43, SD 
= 1.34), F(1, 77) = 19.51, p < .001. Also supporting predictions, only among Undergraduates 
was meaninglessness angst significantly negatively correlated with self-esteem, r = -.78, p < .001 
(Holdemans: r = -.18, Unitarian Universalists: r = -.18); while among Unitarian Universalists, 
meaninglessness angst was significantly negatively correlated with perceived world benevolence, 
r = - .44, p = .03 (somewhat surprisingly, this was also the case with Undergraduates, r = -.45, p 
= .01, although this association was much weaker than that between meaninglessness angst and 
self-esteem; for Holdemans: r = .11, n. s.). These findings suggest that self-esteem and the belief 
in a benevolent world are culturally derived buffers against meaninglessness angst amongst 
Undergraduates and Unitarian Universalists, respectively. 
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 Condemnation angst. A planned contrast found that Unitarian Universalists showed a 
lower level of condemnation angst (M = 1.98, SD = 1.01) compared to the other two groups (M = 
2.91, SD = 1.43), F(1, 77) = 5.70, p = .02. Also supporting predictions, only among Unitarian 
Universalists was condemnation angst significantly negatively correlated with the perceived 
benevolence of people, r = - .49, p = .02 (Holdemans: r = -.23, Undergraduates: r = -.31), while 
among Undergraduates, condemnation angst was significantly negatively correlated with self-
esteem, r = -.38, p = .04 (somewhat surprisingly, this was also the case with Unitarian 
Universalists, r = - .41, p = .04, although this association was weaker than that between 
condemnation angst and benevolence of people; for Holdemans: r = -.32, n. s.). These findings 
suggest that the belief in human benevolence and self-esteem are culturally derived buffers 
against condemnation angst amongst Unitarian Universalists and Undergraduates, respectively. 
Mediation analyses  
Death angst. Because Undergraduates scored higher than the other two groups on vertical 
individualism and the randomness WAS subscale, and because these two variables were 
positively correlated with death angst, a bootstrapping mediation analysis was performed with 
group as the predictor (Undergraduates = 1, Holdemans = -.5, Unitarian Universalists = -.5), 
death angst as the outcome, and vertical individualism and randomness entered as potential 
mediators. The 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect of group via the mediator of 
vertical individualism did not contain zero (.02, .72). This suggests that Undergraduates’ higher 
level of death angst is due, at least in part, to their greater degree of vertical individualism. 
Interestingly, a reverse-mediational analysis with death angst entered as the mediator and vertical 
individualism as the outcome also was significant, 95% CI (.20, .83). This accords with a mutual 
constitution model of the relationship between threat experience and culture. Not only do higher 
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rates of vertical individualism contribute to death angst among Undergraduates, but the 
experience of death angst may also attach them more deeply to vertical individualist culture. 
 Guilt. Because Holdemans scored higher than the other two groups on orthodox 
religiosity, intrinsic religiosity, and collectivism, and because these three variables were 
positively correlated with guilt, a similar mediation analysis was performed with group as the 
predictor (Holdemans = 1, Undergraduates = -.5, Unitarian Universalists = -.5), guilt as the 
outcome, and orthodox religiosity, intrinsic religiosity, and collectivism entered as potential 
mediators (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). Five-thousand bootstrapping resamples were performed. 
No results were significant at α = .05. However, the 90% confidence interval for the indirect 
effect of group via the mediator of orthodox religiosity did not contain zero (.06, .96). This 
tentatively suggests that the Holdemans’ greater tendency to experience guilt is partly due to 
their stronger orthodox religious beliefs. A reverse-mediational analysis with guilt entered as the 
mediator and orthodox religiosity as the outcome was significant, 95% CI (.05, .37), suggesting 
that the Holdemans’ greater attachment to orthodox religious beliefs may be reinforced by their 
proclivity towards greater guilt. 
 Anxiety. Because Holdemans scored lower than the other two groups on existential quest 
and the randomness WAS subscale, and because these two variables were positively correlated 
with anxiety, a similar mediation analysis was performed with group as the predictor 
(Holdemans = 1, Undergraduates = -.5, Unitarian Universalists = -.5), anxiety as the outcome, 
and existential quest and randomness entered as potential mediators. No significant results were 
found.  
 Meaninglessness angst. Because Holdemans scored lower than the other two groups on 
existential quest, horizontal and vertical individualism, and perceived randomness, and because 
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these four variables were positively correlated with meaninglessness angst, a similar mediation 
analysis was performed with group as the predictor (Holdemans = 1, Undergraduates = -.5, 
Unitarian Universalists = -.5), meaninglessness angst as the outcome, and existential quest, both 
forms of individualism, and randomness entered as potential mediators. The 95% CIs for 
existential quest (-.94, -.06) and randomness (-.37, -.002) did not contain zero. This suggests that 
the relatively greater level of meaninglessness angst found in Undergraduates compared to 
Holdemans is likely due to their greater levels of existential quest and perceived randomness, 
while the relatively greater level of meaninglessness angst found in Unitarian Universalists is 
likely due to their greater level of existential quest orientation. Reverse-mediational analyses 
were also significant, with meaninglessness angst entered as the mediator and existential quest, 
95% CI (-.30, -.03), and randomness, 95% CI (-.36, -.03), as the outcomes. This suggests that 
Undergraduates and Unitarian Universalists are both comparatively driven towards quest 
religiosity and perceptions of randomness by their concerns with meaninglessness. 
 Condemnation angst. Because Unitarian Universalists scored lower than the other two 
groups on orthodox religiosity and vertical individualism, and because these two variables were 
positively correlated with condemnation angst, a similar mediation analysis was performed with 
group as the predictor (Unitarians = 1, Holdemans = -.5, Undergraduates = -.5), condemnation 
angst as the outcome, and orthodox religiosity and vertical individualism entered as potential 
mediators. No results were significant at α = .05. However, the 90% confidence interval for the 
indirect effect of group via the mediator of vertical individualism did not contain zero (-25, -
.001). This tentatively suggests that the greater level of condemnation angst among 
Undergraduates relative to Unitarian Universalists is partly due to their greater degree of vertical 
individualism. The reverse-mediational model was non-significant, 95% CI (-.29, .01). 
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Discussion 
 While Study 1 demonstrated how symbolic cultural patterns (i.e., differences in 
religiosity-secularism) within a particular subcultural group determined varying interpretations 
of and reactions to the same hypothetical threat situation, Study 2 connected symbolic systems to 
differences in social organization by mapping broad threat orientations in three groups.  
Holdeman Mennonites, who possess a relatively collectivist social orientation, 
demonstrated high levels of orthodox religiosity, which in turn were associated with a prototypic 
DISA threat pattern: a comparatively greater proclivity towards guilt, and a lesser proclivity to 
experience meaninglessness angst. Religious beliefs and the tendency to engage in reparative 
behavior emerged as culturally derived defenses for the Holdemans. At the opposite end of an 
ideal-typical spectrum, Unitarian Universalists—high in horizontal, but not vertical, 
individualism—exhibited high levels of quest religiosity, which can be considered a form of 
“active” secularism. As expected, members of this group evinced a prototypic DESA threat 
pattern: a greater proclivity towards anxiety, and a lesser proclivity towards condemnation angst. 
Unitarian Universalists defend against threats by relying on their humanist worldview: 
expressive individualism combined with a belief in the ultimate benevolence of the world and 
humanity. Finally, Undergraduates as a subcultural group have strong elements of a vertically 
individualist social orientation, albeit with aspects of horizontal individualism as well. This 
group demonstrated moderate religiosity, and the DESA pattern predicted by my analysis of 
vertical individualism: comparatively greater orientation towards anxiety and death angst. 
Undergraduates seem to rely on a sense of self-esteem to protect themselves against all manner 
of existential threat types.  
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Interestingly, mediational analyses suggested not only that different cultural tendencies 
and worldview components were primarily responsible for group differences in threat 
orientation, but also that the reverse pattern was generally observable as well. In other words, in 
line with my analysis, proclivities toward normative threat experiences may also drive 
attachment to cultural values. 
Considering the two sets of findings as a whole, a great deal of converging evidence was 
found for the overall DISA/DESA distinction as it pertains to the influence of religiosity on 
existential threat. Both as an individual difference assessing a cultural tendency (Study 1) and as 
a between-group difference (Study 2), greater religiosity was associated with proclivities towards 
guilt and away from meaninglessness angst. Tendencies towards secularism—as assessed by a 
measure of quest religiosity—appeared to manifest somewhat differently, however, in the two 
studies. Among Undergraduates (Study 1), greater levels of quest religiosity were associated 
with the tendency to defend against threat by bolstering perceived control over the environment 
via the belief in a just world. However, in Study 2, the group scoring highest in quest 
religiosity—Unitarian Universalists—did not show a defensive pattern of reliance on personal 
control. Rather, for Unitarian Universalists, quest religiosity seems to be part of a humanist 
worldview to which they turn when faced with threat. This supports my contention that vertical 
and horizontal individualists may tend to possess different forms of secularism, one more 
“passive” and encouraging self-focus and self-reliance, while the other more “active” and 
encouraging a positive view of this-worldly life. Study 2 also augmented Study 1 by 
demonstrating that, for Undergraduates as a whole, the primary line of defense against threat 
may be individual self-esteem (although tendencies towards religiosity or secularism may also 
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orient different Undergraduates towards additional responses or defenses). This is to be expected, 
if Undergraduate culture is indeed characterized by a high degree of vertical individualism. 
General discussion 
Advances of the present study 
These studies generally demonstrated that individuals who endorse more collectivist or 
devoutly religious tendencies will have a DISA orientation, and will therefore be more likely to 
experience existential threats in terms of guilt, and to defend against these threats by relying on 
their bond with others, their group membership, or their faith. They further demonstrated that 
individuals who endorse more individualist or secular tendencies will have a DESA orientation, 
and will therefore be more likely to experience existential threats in terms of anxiety and concern 
with meaninglessness, and to defend against these threats by relying on their self-esteem, sense 
of personal control, or belief in the general benevolence of humanity. Any of these findings 
considered in isolation is not necessarily novel or unsupported by prior research. For example, 
there is a considerable body of literature testifying to the relationship between (devout, intrinsic) 
religiosity and the tendencies to experience more guilt and less anxiety (e.g., Batson et al., 1993). 
There is also a smaller but nevertheless available body of evidence suggesting that collectivists 
are more prone to guilt than individualists, whereas the opposite is true when it comes to anxiety, 
uncertainty, or fear of death (see Sullivan, 2013). Additionally, a vast body of literature shows 
that people in individualist cultures rely on self-serving biases and personal control, whereas 
collectivists tend to rely on secondary control and support networks (e.g., Kay & Sullivan, 2012). 
However, the present investigation advances beyond these prior studies in a number of ways. 
Study 1 makes a modest advance insofar as much of the prior research on these topics—
particularly concerning the influence of culture and religion on existential threat—has been 
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correlational, rather than experimental. By manipulating exposure to a threat, I was able to better 
establish the causal role of threat experience in eliciting cultural defenses. Study 2 makes several 
key advances. Most relevant prior research in social psychology has not considered the 
interrelatedness of symbolic beliefs and social organization, but has focused either on religious 
or “cultural” (i.e., individualism-collectivism) differences. Study 2 clearly demonstrates that 
religion is a cultural factor that is strongly associated with variation in social orientation, which 
suggests that the body of research on religion’s role in existential issues should be connected to 
the relevant studies in cultural psychology (see Cohen & Hill, 2007). 
Additionally, most prior studies have focused only on one kind of threat experience (i.e., 
guilt or anxiety), or have grouped several scales of threat sensitivity together into a general 
measure of “mental health,” rather than considering the important interrelationships between 
threats (for example, Study 2’s finding that cultural groups tend to be either comparatively 
higher in guilt or anxiety proneness). This further implies that prior work has not generally 
considered the possibility that one cultural orientation might predispose individuals towards one 
kind of threat, while another orientation will predispose individuals towards a different form of 
threat. Finally, prior research has similarly failed to highlight the connections between culturally 
conditioned threats and defenses. In other words, the present studies make an advance by 
demonstrating that cultural systems orient individuals towards certain kinds of threat experience 
and corresponding solutions or defenses. In general, all of these limitations are characteristic of 
most research on existential threat (Sullivan et al., 2012). 
Limitations and alternate explanations 
There are some limitations to the present studies, which might be viewed as leaving open 
certain alternate explanations of the findings. Although I argued that Study 1 showed evidence of 
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cultural differences in threat orientation, all participants in the study shared a general cultural 
background (U.S. Undergraduates). Despite the fact that the pattern of results suggest the 
importance of variation in religiosity-secularism, even within a given population, it could be 
contended that these do not really qualify as meaningful cultural differences. Given the broad 
definition of culture I offered, these findings should certainly be considered suggestive evidence 
of the role of historical exposure to different patterns of activity and symbol in conditioning 
threat experiences. But Study 2 makes a significant contribution by demonstrating convergent 
patterns in what were clearly distinguishable subcultures.  
It might be argued that some of Study 2’s findings could be primarily driven by age 
differences between the groups. There is certainly evidence that age had an influence on some of 
the variables measured; for instance, across the sample age was negatively correlated with death 
angst. It is possible, therefore, that the Undergraduates’ greater orientation toward death angst 
was simply a developmental effect. While I do not deny the influential role of age in many 
existential issues, there are several reasons why I believe that this factor alone cannot account 
exclusively for any of the present findings. First, age was controlled for in all between-group 
statistical analyses. Second, while Undergraduates and Unitarian Universalists were the youngest 
and oldest groups, respectively, they were more similar to each other in their general cultural 
pattern (despite important differences) than to the Holdemans, a finding that would be expected 
from a cultural perspective but which cannot be readily explained by a pure developmental 
account. Third, mediational analyses controlling for age suggest that cultural differences between 
groups play a significant role in many of the threat-related differences (e.g., Undergraduates’ 
greater death angst was driven by their greater vertical individualism). Fourth, an analysis testing 
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for age as a potential mediator of the group effect on death angst was non-significant. Fifth, age 
was only correlated with six of the total variables across the entire sample. 
It could be argued that education differences may have played a role in some of the 
effects observed in Study 2. As mentioned in the introduction to this study, the Holdemans 
generally do not pursue higher education, whereas many Unitarian Universalists are well-
educated and Undergraduates are, by virtue of their group membership, immersed in higher 
education. However, no formal measures of education level were taken in this study. I did not 
take this step because, in this context, education level and type is really inseparable from culture, 
and therefore does not to my mind qualify as an “alternative” or “control” variable. For instance, 
Holdeman Mennonites, while not necessarily college-educated in many instances, nevertheless 
often possess considerable training in their profession, whether agricultural or related to some 
form of commerce or craftsmanship; many are also well-traveled. In short, they are educated 
people, but in a nonconventional sense. Regardless, it may have been interesting to observe if 
some of the cultural differences may have been related to differences on conventional measures 
of education or SES. 
Additionally, there is the possibility that some of Study 2’s findings may have been 
influenced by between-group experimenter or participant effects. For instance, the groups may 
have differed in the extent to which they were trying to give socially desirable responses to the 
questionnaires (indeed, the understanding of “social desirability” probably systematically differs 
between these groups). I do believe that this kind of influence may have occurred (to a non-
quantifiable extent) among the Holdeman Mennonite participants. In general, the idea of 
participating in a psychological study of this kind was clearly more novel to this group than to 
the other two. The participants were aware of the fact that they were invited to participate 
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because of the unusual “extremity” of their beliefs. Admittedly, this was also the case for the 
Unitarian Universalist participants. However, because of their common affiliation with 
academia, many Unitarian Universalists (including those participating in the present study) 
understand the research process or have personal experience with it (Leitgeb, 2009). By contrast, 
not only are the Holdemans less acquainted with (and more mistrusting of) academia generally, 
but they are a fairly under-researched social group, and much of the small amount of research 
pertaining to the Holdemans has presented them in a somewhat negative light (e.g., McAvoy, 
2012), given that their value system conflicts with the horizontal individualism and secular 
emphasis of most academic psychology. For these reasons, the Holdemans may understandably 
have been concerned with how their culture would be portrayed in the present study. The fact 
that the pattern of results support hypotheses that it is very unlikely the Holdemans were aware 
of lessens the significance of this concern. However, these issues are endemic to cross-cultural 
research and also point to some of the general limitations of quantitative studies. Extended 
participant observation with these groups, for example, would be useful to achieve a stage where 
the participants may have been less attentive to the fact that they were being studied. 
The relation of the individual to the group, and the use of Undergraduate samples 
In an important paper, Henri Tajfel (1972/2010) argued that social psychologists tend to 
assume that they are conducting “experiments in a vacuum,” meaning that in the quest for 
experimental control and the elimination of extraneous variables we act as if our research-
collection settings are devoid of unique cultural content, and findings obtained in these settings 
generalize to a large segment of the human population. Sweeping claims of generalization have 
become somewhat less common as cultural psychology has risen to prominence (Henrich et al., 
2010). But increasing awareness of “exotic” cultural differences (e.g., persons in non-
63 
industrialized societies may play decision-making games differently) is somewhat beside the 
point; Tajfel argued, as Shweder (1990) would later, that every experiment is immediately 
“cultural,” meaning scientific studies are never carried out in a cultural/social vacuum. Research 
settings, including college campus laboratories, are social settings as much as any other type of 
setting. Participants enter such settings with particular expectations of the activity they will be 
engaged in, just as they are always embedded in a cultural context that shapes their cognition and 
behavior in particular ways.  
The findings of Study 2 are interesting in light of these observations. Psychologists 
continue to operate as if European-American university Undergraduates (or, increasingly, 
representative samples of the Internet-using population in a given nation) are—if not 
representative of the entire human race—a kind of “control group” or standard against which 
“unexpected” findings in “alternate” populations (e.g., lower SES groups; collectivists; East 
Asian students) may be compared. It would be possible to view the findings of Study 2 in this 
way; Undergraduates were the “control group” against which the “outlier” groups (hyper-
collectivist Holdemans and hyper-individualist Unitarian Universalists) were compared. There 
may be some validity to this view, but I believe it is more useful to interpret the pattern of results 
as reflecting the fact that Undergraduates are a unique cultural group in their own right. 
Obviously the affiliation “Undergraduate” is of a different order than the two religious 
affiliations that were also examined in Study 2. In both vertical and horizontal individualist 
cultural settings, people typically claim multiple group memberships, and self-categorize 
primarily in terms of one social identity (or in terms of their personal identity) at a given time 
depending on aspects of the situational context (Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994). 
Although important for understanding the psychology of “individualists,” these forms of social 
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identity are often quite psychologically abstract and different from the forms of relational 
embeddedness characteristic of group membership in collectivist contexts, such as Holdeman 
Mennonite communities (Brewer & Yuki, 2007). Vertical individualists in particular may 
identify with several groups, but do not necessarily derive a symbolically complex sense of 
identity from any of them. Indeed, a vertical individualist could be a “low-identifier” with their 
nation, their gender, their university affiliation, and so on, and think of themselves primarily in 
terms of their personal identity, a conglomerate of these various identities. More importantly for 
the present research, although vertical individualists may symbolically bolster such identities in 
situations of existential threat, these groups may not provide many concrete resources to help the 
individual in situations such as natural disasters. In fact, in an individualist setting, rather than 
relying on one group for identity and material/symbolic support, it may actually be more 
important to possess many group affiliations to construct a resilient self-identity with access to 
multiple sources of support (Iyer, Jetten, Tsivrikos, Postmes, & Haslam, 2009). 
However, many people in individualist cultures still belong to a “primary” group which 
provides more concrete and shared markers of identity, as well as support in times of threat or 
distress. Some Undergraduates seem to practice religiosity in this way, as demonstrated in Study 
1. Increasingly, for many people in individualist cultures, their immediate family may be the 
only group identity that provides a constant source of concrete meaning and self-definition 
across the lifespan.  
Whether or not it is a valid claim that Undergraduates constitute a vertical individualist 
culture, it is important to acknowledge that in the majority of our studies, this is how we attempt 
to study our participants. We see them as vertical individualists, atomistic entities devoid of 
specific group memberships and worldview content. We recruit individuals on the basis of their 
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belonging to large, anonymous organizations—such as a university, a nation, or a population of 
Internet users. Our statistics assume “independence of observations”—our participants are all 
ideally unrelated to each other, in both a genetic and psychological sense. Furthermore, I would 
argue that this is what psychological experience is actually like for many people in modern, 
postindustrial societies, including Undergraduates. Although such individuals often do possess 
group affiliations, these identities are increasingly less salient as globalized culture becomes 
more atomized and privatized (Putnam, 2001). Even when such identities are salient, their 
content is increasingly abstract and personalized to suit the individual’s complex identity.  
At least this is how Undergraduates think of themselves when they enter studies. We 
encourage them to fill out our surveys as individuals, providing us their own, private responses— 
and generally, this is exactly what they do. 
Directions for future research 
 Clearly, these studies are only an initial step in establishing a cultural-existential 
psychology. While other important contemporary work is attempting to examine the moderating 
role of culture and social structure in reactions to existential threat (e.g., Fernandez, Castano, & 
Singh, 2010; Kim, Zeppenfeld, & Cohen, in press), many more studies need to be done. To offer 
one of many possible examples, the mediational analyses performed in Study 2 generally 
provided support for both the possibility that cultural tendencies orient individuals towards 
certain kinds of threat experience, and that threat proclivities increase our attachment to certain 
cultural tendencies. Longitudinal and experimental studies should be conducted to investigate 
this bidirectional process further, and to determine if one direction in the threat-culture cycle is 
stronger or takes causal priority over the other. 
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 Furthermore, many more studies would need to be carried out to establish the usefulness 
and validity of the DISA/DESA distinction. The current studies offer a hopeful first step when 
considered in combination with several suggestive prior studies that were not designed with this 
specific theoretical distinction in mind (Sullivan, 2013). However, even the studies reported here 
show that however useful the DISA/DESA classification may be at a broad level, cultures are 
varied enough to evade strict conformity to such an overarching dichotomy. Undergraduates, for 
example, considered a general DESA pattern across both studies; yet Study 1 showed that 
religious differences within this group predict variation in the extent to which members endorse 
this threat orientation. Complicating matters further, while both Undergraduates and Unitarian 
Universalists showed DESA tendencies in Study 2, there were also important distinctions in 
threat orientation between these two groups. Future investigations should bear in mind that 
although the DISA/DESA distinction may map out the elemental forms of cultural threat 
orientation, there will be considerable variability in how these patterns manifest in any particular 
cultural group. 
 The findings of Study 2 also have significance for the XXP literature. Studies supporting 
hypotheses from terror management theory regarding the role of death awareness in self-esteem 
striving have been largely conducted with Undergraduates. Given that Undergraduates as a 
cultural group seem to be especially high in orientation towards death angst, and especially likely 
to rely on self-esteem as a defense mechanism, it is possible that self-esteem may function as an 
anxiety buffer primarily in vertically individualist settings. In strongly religious or collectivist 
groups, death reminders may be more likely to elicit worldview defense than self-esteem 
bolstering. 
Conclusion: Better ways of coping with threat? 
67 
 Taken as a whole, this research shows that there are different ways of interpreting the 
negative events and possibilities we encounter in our lives, and different ways of systematically 
coping with these threats. A question that naturally arises from this research is whether there are 
normatively “better” ways of being oriented towards existential threat. Of course, “better” can be 
defined in many different ways in this context. There is the question of whether individuals in a 
culture experience more or less existential angst overall, and how this general level of angst 
might contribute to physical health. There is the issue of whether members of a culture may 
experience less overt angst at the expense of being more repressive, perhaps having higher levels 
of unconscious angst leading to the oppression of others. And there is also the question of how a 
particular cultural mode of threat orientation relates to the long-term, supra-individual 
sustainability of a given form of social orientation. 
Generally, the purpose of this research was not to show that either DISA or DESA 
orientations are “better.” Both have potential benefits and costs at multiple levels; but the 
broader point is that an important aspect of the functionality and sustainability of a set of cultural 
patterns is its capacity to successfully orient individuals towards meaningful threat 
interpretations while also providing psychologically satisfying solutions to those threats.  
Nevertheless, the findings of Study 2 pertaining to the vertical individualism of 
Undergraduates do suggest that this particular form of social orientation may be considered sub-
ideal from a number of psychologically informed standpoints. As argued in the introduction to 
Study 2, vertical individualism is essentially a social orientation that arose from capitalist social 
organization and has been accelerated by neoliberal capitalism. The pattern of results in Study 2 
suggest that Undergraduates are actually oriented towards both anxiety and death angst as a 
function of their immersion in vertically individualist culture. This finding supplements 
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theoretical perspectives suggesting that capitalism is the first form of social integration (since 
slavery and totalitarian regimes) that functions without providing a strong sense of existential 
security to its members. Indeed, capitalism is arguably unique in history in that it actually thrives 
off the existential insecurity that it generates. Whereas dictatorships are always in danger if 
individuals reach a critical threshold of dissatisfaction, vertical individualism is enhanced when 
individuals compete with each other for innovation and effort as a result of their anxiety-induced 
quest for self-esteem. Furthermore, the luxury products of capitalism are sold largely because 
they meet individuals’ needs for self-identity, resulting from their meaninglessness angst and 
desire to avoid condemnation. In other words, the capitalist economic system functions smoothly 
while its corresponding cultural system is increasingly jeopardized by feelings of anomie, 
clinical depression, sleep, eating, and anxiety disorders, and a host of other ills (Habermas, 
1987). Throughout evolutionary history, culture has facilitated human flourishing by helping 
individuals convince themselves that they were less imperiled than they actually were (by the 
elements, predators, other humans). With the rise of capitalism, it seems that human modes of 
socio-economic organization have outpaced and even reversed this traditional function of 
culture. These contemporary structures flourish by convincing even the most affluent members 
of society that they are fundamentally vulnerable. 
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Footnotes 
1. Heidegger distinguished between the level of the existenzial—universal structural aspects of 
human existence—and the level of the existenzielle—concrete manifestations of human existence 
in localized spatial-temporal and symbolic contexts (see Schrag, 1961). Prior XXP research has 
focused on the former level, while ignoring the latter. In other words, XXP has stressed the 
universal function of culture for humans – protecting them from threats of mortality, uncertainty, 
and meaninglessness – and admitting of cultural diversity only insofar as it acknowledges that 
the specific content of the culturally-derived anxiety buffer varies by context. However, there is a 
great deal of patterned variation in the contextually afforded manifestations of human threat 
experience that has been glossed over by existential psychologists but which lends itself to 
systematic exploration. This exploration of human existenzielle is a primary goal of cultural-
existential psychology. The importance of acknowledging both human universals and 
meaningful cultural variation, with specific relevance for psychology and threat-defense systems, 
has been discussed at length by Hallowell (1967) and Spiro (1965; 1967). See also Tajfel’s 
(1972) discussion of levels of generalizability in social psychological experiments. 
2. For a discussion of the points of similarity and contrast between psychological anthropology 
and contemporary cultural psychology, see Shweder (1990). Shweder contends that 
psychological anthropology’s assumption of a “central processing mechanism” behind cultural 
variation differentiates it from cultural psychology. While Shweder is correct to point out the 
obfuscations that have repeatedly occurred as a result of psychology’s search for such 
mechanisms, cultural-existential psychology must share with psychological anthropology and 
existentialism the assumption that there are some basic structural universals in the human 
experience, including awareness and fear of mortality. To ignore the likelihood of such 
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universals seems irresponsible in light of evolutionary theory and the explanatory power of 
biology’s modern synthesis, and may amount to an untenable denial of embodiment. 
3. Naturally, an alternate sequence is possible whereby I (1) experience guilt over my inability to 
write a good dissertation; (2) fail my defense, become convinced that I am a terrible academic, 
and experience condemnation angst; and (3) drop out of graduate school, and—finding no other 
means of employment—decide that I am a valueless person while in the thrall of nihilistic 
despair. The important differences between these two sequences are (1) my prospective focus in 
the case of the anxiety path versus my retrospective focus in the case of the guilt path; and (2) 
the fact that as I proceed along the anxiety path, my worldview is increasingly divested of any 
value, whereas while I proceed along the guilt path it is myself that is thus divested. These 
examples may seem tongue-in-cheek, and they do not apply in my particular case; however, 
aside from their clarifying function, it should be remembered that many people do actually 
progress through such sequences, and they are not to be taken lightly. 
4. The primary analyses for this study were regression analyses using intrinsic religiosity and 
existential quest scores as continuous predictors, in order to examine greater variability in 
cultural tendencies within a single subculture (Undergraduates). However, I also performed 
categorical analyses using religious identification as a nominal predictor and examining its 
interaction with experimental condition (an analogous procedure to the between-groups approach 
used in Study 2). These analyses did not yield any significant interactions or main effects of 
religious identification. This is possibly due to low power to detect effects among non-Christian 
identifiers, who represented a small portion of the sample; however, it might also testify to the 
possibility that, in a relatively homogenous (and individualist) population like Midwestern 
Undergraduates, denominational identity may not be as important as personal religious-secular 
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attitudes. As expected, non-religious participants scored higher on existential quest, F(3, 84) = 
3.81, p = .01, and lower on intrinsic religiosity, F(3, 84) = 4.96, p = .01, compared to religiously 
identified participants. 
5. Although inter-rater reliability was fair in this situation, I opted not to resolve inter-rater 
disagreements, but to average the independent ratings, for four reasons: (1) Krippendorff’s α was 
not high enough to suggest total agreement and recommend resolving discrepancies; (2) the 
purpose of the coding was exploration of possible patterns, rather than definitive hypothesis 
testing; (3) in this exploratory context, averaging, rather than resolving, disagreements avoided 
too much bias directing the final ratings; and (4) averaging produced better approximation to 
continuous data, allowing for greater variability in the ratings. 
6. The decision to average guilt and fear emotions into a single scale may seem to run counter to 
the guiding analysis, which suggests that anxiety and guilt are distinct emotions and forms of 
existential threat. However, I constructed this composite because: (1) in line with classic 
existential perspectives, uncertainty-related anxiety is distinct from the emotion of fear, which 
involves being directed towards a concrete object (Sullivan et al., 2012), and (2) I expected that 
general feelings of fear would accompany feelings of guilt in the emotional experience of a 
natural disaster, among those participants inclined towards such an experience. For instance, if 
guilt in response to a disaster represents a (nonconscious) sense of punishment (the disaster was 
somehow deserved), then fear of retribution should necessarily accompany this emotion 
(Wolfenstein, 1977). If the emotion items are examined separately, the interaction effect on the 
specific emotion of guilt is only marginal, β = .26, SE = .09, t(84) = 1.62, p = .11, but the pattern 
of results remains the same. 
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7. The WAS also includes randomness, luck, benevolence of people, and benevolence of the 
world subscales. Submitting scores on each of these composites to the main regression analyses 
(REL x video; EQ x video) yielded only the following effects: (1) perceptions of randomness in 
the world  were negatively associated with intrinsic religiosity, β = -.34, SE = .08, t(85) = -3.32, 
p < .01, and positively associated with existential quest, β = .56, SE = .13, t(85) = 6.21, p < .001; 
(2) existential quest scores tended to be positively associated with perceptions of the self as 
lucky, β = .20, SE = .18, t(85) = 1.85, p = .07; (3) a marginally significant EQ x video interaction 
on benevolence of people, β = .31, SE = .27, t(84) = 1.95, p = .06, driven primarily by a negative 
association between existential quest scores and perceived benevolence of others in the no threat 
condition; and (4) a main effect of video condition on perceptions of the world as benevolent, 
such that those in the tornado condition tended to view the world as a more benevolent place (M 
= 4.86, SD = 1.18), β = .20, SE = .26, t(85) = 1.89, p = .06. 
8. Focus on disaster situation vs. Focus on disaster aftermath and Loss of property and 
possessions in financial terms did not significantly load onto any of the factors, nor did they 
correlate with any of them. Generally, participants tended to write more about the aftermath of 
the tornado than the immediate disaster experience, M = 4.36, SD = .91. By contrast, participants 
tended not to emphasize the loss of property in financial terms, M = 1.93, SD = .87, although the 
theme was not entirely absent and appears to have been an isolated factor.  
9. It is difficult to define the neoliberal movement succinctly, and an extended examination of it 
is beyond the scope of this document. However, because of its importance for Study 2, a 
relatively brief definition will be provided here. Following several economists (see, in overview, 
Smith et al., 2011) and the theorizing of Harvey (2005), I define neoliberalism as follows: A 
political compromise between the capitalist and managerial classes beginning prominently in the 
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late 1970s, intended to resolve economic crises and promoting the following agenda: (1) 
maintaining and/or re-establishing U.S. (and, to a lesser extent, European) political and economic 
hegemony; (2) the de-regulation of markets; (3) the financialization of capital; (4) the 
globalization of capital. Although many theorists hold that the deliberate attempt to accumulate 
and consolidate wealth among the capitalist and managerial classes (at the expense of the 
working class) is an essential aspect of neoliberalism (and I generally agree with them), it is not 
essential to my argument in this paper. It should be noted that while neoliberalism has many 
cultural psychological aspects, my use of the term points more towards the structural (political, 
economic) changes it initiated, which are theorized to have contributed to certain cultural 
psychological changes (e.g., the acceleration of vertical individualism in the United States).  
10. I did not have specific hypotheses regarding the possible influence of gender on any of the 
outcome variables. In addition, the sample was somewhat underpowered to detect gender x 
group interaction effects. However, when gender was included along with group as a between-
subjects variable in all analyses, the following effects emerged: A main effect of gender on 
perceived justice, F(1, 72) = 5.72, p = .02, such that men scored higher (M = 3.53, SD = 1.23) 
than women (M = 2.84, SD = 1.06); A main effect of gender on perceived controllability, F(1, 
72) = 7.38, p < .01, such that men again scored higher (M = 4.72, SD = 1.02) than women (M = 
3.86, SD = 1.21); A main effect of gender on anxiety, F(1, 73) = 4.07, p = .05, such that women 
scored higher (M = 4.87, SD = .89) than men (M = 4.21, SD = 1.03); An interaction effect on 
guilt, F(2, 72) = 3.09, p = .05, driven by the tendency for Undergraduate men to score lower (M 
= 5.04, SD = 1.57) than all other groups; An interaction effect on intrinsic religiosity, F(2, 73) = 
5.81, p < .01, driven by the tendency for Unitarian Universalist women to score higher (M = 
4.86, SD = 1.50) than Unitarian Universalist men (M = 2.66, SD = 1.90); and an interaction effect 
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on collectivism, F(1, 73) = 3.59, p = .03, driven by the tendency for Unitarian Universalist men 
to score higher (M = 4.88, SD = .65) than Unitarian Universalist women (M = 3.84, SD = .91). 
When gender was added as a second covariate to each of the analyses described in the Results 
section, all between-group effects remained significant, with the exception of the effect on 
perceived benevolence of the world, which became marginal, p = .08.   
11. Age was controlled for in all reported analyses, with the exception of within-group 
correlations. Across the entire sample, age was significantly negatively correlated with vertical 
and horizontal individualism, and with death and condemnation angst, rs > -.33, ps < .01; and 
significantly positively correlated with guilt and perceived benevolence of the world, rs > .29, ps 
< .01. Within groups, the only significant associations with age were found – surprisingly – 
among undergraduates, the group with the most restricted age range. Specifically, older 
undergraduates professed less orthodox religiosity, r = - .53, p < .01, and they tended to be more 
horizontally individualist, r = .35, p = .06. 
12. Due to the specialized nature of two of the populations of interest (especially the Holdeman 
Mennonites), sample sizes were limited for the three groups, precluding the possibility of 
structural equation models and limiting the power of two-way interaction regression models. 
However, the total sample of 80 was sufficient for between-groups ANOVAs and within-group 
correlation analyses. 
13. I predicted that Undergraduates would score higher than the other two groups on the justice 
and self-controllability subscales of the WAS (see data analysis strategy). The planned contrasts 
for these two outcomes were not significant, Fs < 3.2, ps > .08. Generally supporting predictions, 
Undergraduates had greater belief in a just world than Unitarian Universalists, p < .01, and 
nonsignificantly tended to have greater belief in a just world than Holdemans, p = .18. The 
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marginally significant finding for self-controllability was the opposite of the prediction, 
however—Undergraduates tended to have lower self-controllability compared to the other two 
groups. This suggests that Undergraduates are perhaps even more oriented to a culture of 
vulnerability and disorientation than expected (a possibility consonant with longitudinal research 
on Undergraduate control perceptions by Twenge, Zhang, & Im, 2004). However, only among 
Undergraduates, self-controllability and randomness were positively correlated, r = .53, p < .01, 
suggesting (in line with the results of Study 1) that Undergraduates do rely on perceived self-
control to defend themselves against the threat of a chaotic world.
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Table 1. Conceptual overview of cultural variables and worldview components among the three 
groups (Study 2). 
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Table 2. Conceptual overview of threat orientations, proximal causes, and culturally derived 
defenses among the three groups (Study 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Em-dashes indicate that the data were not conclusive on this issue. 
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Table 3. Estimated marginal means (controlling for age) and standard deviations for all cultural 
variables (Study 2). 
Holdeman 
Mennonites 
Undergraduates 
Unitarian 
Universalists 
M SD M SD M SD 
Orthodox Religiosity 6.78 .30 4.00 1.50 2.14 1.22 
Intrinsic Religiosity 6.93 .18 4.15 1.55 4.12 1.93 
Existential Quest 2.93 .94 4.83 .84 5.67 .88 
Collectivism 6.28 .62 4.60 .87 4.17 .96 
Vertical Individualism 3.94 .91 4.75 1.18 3.50 1.08 
Horizontal 
Individualism 
3.31 1.06 4.88 1.09 4.91 1.22 
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Table 4. Estimated marginal means (controlling for age) and standard deviations for all 
worldview components and defensive structures (Study 2). 
Holdeman 
Mennonites 
Undergraduates 
Unitarian 
Universalists 
M SD M SD M SD 
Controllability 4.94 .97 4.11 .96 3.71 1.30 
Self-controllability 5.68 .65 5.18 .84 5.54 .76 
Randomness 4.09 1.17 5.58 1.02 4.56 .99 
Justice 3.25 1.24 3.82 1.10 2.23 1.01 
Benevolence of the 
world 
4.96 1.14 4.00 1.22 5.81 1.42 
Benevolence of people 4.59 .86 4.16 1.25 5.64 .78 
Self-esteem 4.90 .96 5.21 1.63 6.05 1.00 
Luck 5.17 1.09 4.76 1.42 5.15 .83 
Reparative behavior 6.85 .68 4.85 2.02 5.45 2.01 
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Table 5. Estimated marginal means (controlling for age) and standard deviations for all threat 
orientations (Study 2). 
Holdeman 
Mennonites 
Undergraduates 
Unitarian 
Universalists 
M SD M SD M SD 
Guilt 6.58 .59 5.81 1.24 5.86 .71 
Anxiety 3.92 .93 4.95 1.08 4.81 .67 
Death Angst 2.19 .96 4.25 1.62 3.00 1.52 
Meaninglessness 
Angst 
1.20 .42 2.67 1.33 2.19 1.36 
Condemnation Angst 2.78 1.27 3.14 1.49 1.86 1.01 
94 
Figure 1. Levels and types of existential threat. 
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Figure 2. Guilt and fear as a function of intrinsic religiosity and video condition (Study 1). 
 
Note. Higher scores indicate greater feelings of guilt and fear (Scale ranged from 1-5). 
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Figure 3. Perceived justice as a function of existential quest and video condition (Study 1).  
 
Note. Higher scores indicate greater perceived justice (Scale ranged from 1-7).
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Figure 4. Perceived control as a function of existential quest and video condition (Study 1).  
 
Note. Higher scores indicate greater perceived control (Scale ranged from 1-7). 
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Figure 5. Mediation model (Study 1). 
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Appendix A: Items for all Measures Used in Study 1 
Intrinsic religiosity 
My faith involves all of my life. 
One should seek God’s guidance when making every important decision. 
In my life I experience the presence of the Divine. 
My faith sometimes restricts my actions. 
Nothing is as important to me as serving God as best I know how. 
I try hard to carry my religion over into all my other dealings in life. 
My religious beliefs are what really lie behind my whole approach to life. 
It doesn’t matter so much what I believe as long as I lead a moral life. (R) 
Although I am a religious person, I refuse to let religious considerations influence my everyday 
affairs. (R) 
Although I believe in my religion, I feel there are many more important things in life. (R) 
Existential quest 
Today, I still wonder about the meaning and goal of my life. 
My attitude towards religion/spirituality is likely to change according to my life experiences. 
Being able to doubt about one’s convictions and to reappraise them is a good quality. 
In my opinion, doubt is important in “existential” questions. 
My way of seeing the world is certainly going to change again. 
My opinion varies on a lot of subjects. 
I know perfectly well what the goal of my life is. (R) 
Years go by but my way of seeing the world doesn’t change. 
I often reappraise my opinion on religious/spiritual beliefs. 
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World Assumptions Scale (WAS) 
Justice—Misfortune is least likely to strike worthy, decent people; Generally, people deserve 
what they get in this world; People will experience good fortune if they themselves are good; By 
and large, good people get what they deserve in this world 
Self-controllability—I usually behave in ways that are likely to maximize good results for me; I 
almost always make an effort to prevent bad things from happening to me; I take the actions 
necessary to protect myself against misfortune; I usually behave so as to bring about the greatest 
good for me 
Controllability—People’s misfortunes result from mistakes they have made; Through our actions 
we can prevent bad things from happening to us; If people took preventive actions, most 
misfortune could be avoided; When bad things happen, it is typically because people have not 
taken the necessary actions to protect themselves 
Self-esteem—I often think I am no good at all (R); I have a low opinion of myself (R); I am very 
satisfied with the kind of person I am; I have reason to be ashamed of my personal character 
Randomness—Bad events are distributed to people at random; The course of our lives is largely 
determined by chance; Life is too full of uncertainties that are determined by chance; In general, 
life is mostly a gamble 
Luck—I am basically a lucky person; When I think about it, I consider myself very lucky; 
Looking at my life, I realize that chance events have worked out well for me; I am luckier than 
most people 
Benevolence of people—People are naturally unfriendly and unkind (R); Human nature is 
basically good; People don’t really care what happens to the next person (R); People are 
basically kind and helpful 
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Benevolence of the world—The good things that happen in this world far outnumber the bad; 
There is more good than evil in the world; The world is a good place; If you look closely enough, 
you will see that the world is full of goodness 
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Appendix B: Responses to Open-ended Questions (Study 2) 
 After completing the rest of the questionnaires, participants in all three groups responded 
to open-ended questions. The Holdeman Mennonites responded to three questions about their 
religiosity: “What does your Christian faith mean to you? How does it influence your daily 
life?”; “How does your Christian faith give your life meaning and purpose?”; and “How does 
your Christian faith help you cope with times of trouble, suffering, or misfortune?” 
Undergraduates and Unitarian Universalists responded to the same three prompts, but with the 
adjective “Christian” removed (i.e., they answered the questions with reference to “faith,” 
however they understood that concept). Additionally, because of their focus on community 
belonging as opposed to traditional religiosity, Unitarian Universalists responded to three 
questions about community: “What does the idea of community mean to you?”; “How does 
belonging to the Unitarian Universalist community influence your life? Does this community 
help give your life meaning and purpose?”; and “How does your participation in this community 
help you cope with times of trouble, suffering, or misfortune?” Holdemans and Undergraduates 
did not complete the questions about community. 
 Holdeman Mennonites often responded to questions about their faith with variations or 
elaborations of the phrase it is everything. Indeed, one wrote, “It means more then [sic] life to 
me,” and another, “…it influences everything I do even at my job or while I am driving etc.” 
Many participants discussed their relationship with God in terms of nearness, servitude, humility, 
trust, and a provided sense of direction and/or stability. A few mentioned that without faith, their 
lives would be empty and they would be nothing. Some participants mentioned the prospect of 
eternity, in contrast to “earthly” affairs. A few examples epitomize the common responses: “My 
Christian life gives me the stability to face every suffering or misfortune. I have no fear of the 
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future. My life is secure,” “I don’t have to worry about the future because I know God is in 
control,” and “My Christian faith…helps me to have victory over bad attitudes, offended feelings 
and all those bad tho’ts [sic] the devil wants to tempt us with.” One Holdeman participant wrote 
at length about the importance of faith: 
“Trust in God is the most important thing in my life. Without Jesus redeeming me and 
giving me this walk in life, I would feel empty, dissatisfied. Today I was feeling that I 
had gotten drowsy in my spiritual life and was not taking time for God and serving others 
as I should. I prayed about this and God through His Holy Spirit filled my heart and mind 
with one song after another about His love for me and all mankind.” 
 Undergraduates often described their faith and the purpose it lends their lives using 
generic, optimistic phrases like it gets me through rough times or it helps me stay positive. One 
participant connected this faith-based optimism very explicitly to the abstract belief in a just 
world: “I know everything I do will pay off in a good or bad way.” These types of responses are 
best exemplified by one participant who wrote of faith: “It’s like a silent cheerleader urging me 
to move forward.” As this example makes clear, undergraduates often discussed religious faith as 
a motivating force that encouraged and legitimated individuation, rather than primarily 
connecting them to a transcendent power or community. Responses like, “It motivates me to do 
more and act on my word,” “Being faithful to god [sic] to me means believing and being the best 
person I can be. I strive to be a great being and hope God notices,” “Being a good person for my 
own self and not because I’m scared of Hell,” and “I have to life my life to the fullest” were 
common. A few undergraduates gave responses characteristic of another form of individualistic 
religiosity, one more akin to the existential quest variety. For example: “I am not a sheep, blindly 
accepting anything that is thrown at me by society or the Church. I believe in the truth…” and “I 
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am open to a great many beliefs and ideals…[that] I may adapt…to my lifestyle…As I hold a 
many great beliefs [sic], I may fall back on one when I am looking for guidance.” 
 Unitarian Universalists also sometimes responded to questions about the meaning of 
faith with expressions of abstract optimism. However, this optimism was often less personally 
focused and expressed more in terms of the general benevolence of human nature or connection 
to others. For example: “I believe that all beings have at least a spark of basic goodness in their 
hearts,” and “I have faith in the goodness of humans and the dignity and worth of every person.” 
Not uncommonly, this faith in human benevolence was linked either to dedication to social 
justice (“People must band together to confront injustice but we are all capable of choosing 
selfishly or acting kindly”) or to a sense of generativity (“I believe that I have a sense of duty to 
work hard in the path that I have chosen…and to protect my children…[they] will always cherish 
my contributions to them”). One participant described faith as “…a life force, maybe collective 
life force, love force. It is that which keeps me putting one foot in front of the other…all in 
imperfect but perfectly human growth toward light.” The Unitarian Universalists responded 
similarly to questions about the importance and meaning of their community; indeed, some 
insisted that for them, their only sense of “faith” came from community belongingness. For 
example, one participant wrote: “My faith means community to me, this means diversity but also 
shared values,” while another wrote, “My faith…reminds me that I’m part of a community of 
people that care about me.” Responses to questions about community had a special emphasis on 
the ability to be politically and locally involved: “I…have become more aware of social 
injustice…My involvement in fellowship activities gives me purpose – I know I make a 
difference,” and “Being with others who have similar political views is very comforting. I enjoy 
volunteering in the context of the Fellowship…” 
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Appendix C: Items for all Novel Measures Used in Study 2 
Collectivism 
I would do what would please my family, even if I detested that activity. 
I would sacrifice an activity that I enjoy very much if my community did not approve of it. 
Children should be taught to place duty before pleasure. 
It is important to maintain harmony within my community. 
My happiness depends very much on the happiness of those around me. 
I feel good when I cooperate with others. 
Vertical individualism 
Competition is the law of nature. 
I enjoy working in situations involving competition with others. 
When another person does something better than I do, I get tense and upset. 
Horizontal individualism 
I enjoy being unique and different from others in many ways. 
One should live one’s life independently of others. 
What happens to me is my own doing. 
Guilt 
After realizing you have received too much change at a store, you decide to keep it because the 
clerk doesn’t notice. What is the likelihood you would feel uncomfortable about this? 
You make a big mistake at work. Afterwards your boss criticizes you in front of the other people 
you work with. What is the likelihood you would feel like you behaved foolishly? 
You secretly commit a felony crime. What is the likelihood that you would feel remorse about 
breaking the law? 
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You accidentally damage your neighbor’s car, but another neighbor is blamed for the damage. 
Later, this person confronts you about what you have done. What is the likelihood that you 
would feel like a coward? 
You lie to people but they never find out about it. What is the likelihood that you would feel 
terrible about the lies you told? 
Anxiety 
You might have a major health problem. How anxious or worried do you feel thinking about this 
possibility? 
Due to changes in circumstances, you might be separated for a while from some people who are 
close to you. How anxious or worried do you feel thinking about this possibility? 
Due to rising costs of living, at some point in your life your income might not be enough to 
support your lifestyle. How anxious or worried do you feel thinking about this possibility? 
You might develop dental problems. How anxious or worried do you feel thinking about this 
possibility? 
I often think that the things that were once important in life are empty. 
I never think about emptiness. (R) 
Death angst 
I often think about death and this causes me anxiety. 
I am not anxious about death because I am prepared for whatever it may bring. (R) 
Meaninglessness angst 
I often feel anxious because I am worried that life might have no meaning. 
I know that life has meaning. (R) 
Condemnation angst 
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I often feel anxious because I feel condemned. 
I never feel anxious about being condemned. (R) 
